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ABSTRACT 
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN COMPETITIVE STRATEGY AND PROCESS TECHNOLOGY 
IN THE TOOLING AND MACHINING INDUSTRY 
MAY 1991 
STEVEN W. CONGDEN, B.S., CLARKSON UNIVERSITY 
M.B.A., CLARKSON UNIVERSITY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Dean M. Schroeder 
A considerable segment of the business literature has 
espoused the importance of appropriately using process or 
manufacturing technology to support competitive strategy. 
This literature implicitly and explicitly suggests the 
importance of "fit" between a firm’s business level strategy 
and its process technology. 
Three gaps remain with respect to the "fit" assertion: 
(1) The nature of fit is insufficiently specified. (2) No 
empirical research has attempted to statistically validate 
the existence of fit within an industry. (3) No empirical 
research has attempted to statistically link fit to firm 
performance. 
To address these issues, this dissertation surveys 
firms in the U.S. tooling and machining industry to test 
hypotheses on the nature, existence, and impact on perform¬ 
ance of fit. Strategy is assessed as membership in one of 
six strategic groups derived from clustering eight strategy 
factors. Factor analysis results in four technology 
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factors, Dedicated Automation, Non-Dedicated Automation, 
Range of Capabilities, and Computer Aided Design. Perform¬ 
ance comprises ROS and average annual sales growth. 
Findings regarding the nature of fit suggest: (1) 
Dedicated and non-dedicated automation relate positively to 
new and existing product stability. Broad product range 
(products very different from each other) relates negatively 
to dedicated automation, but does not relate to non-dedi¬ 
cated automation. (2) Linkages may be obscured because 
multiple capabilities are often bundled in a given technol¬ 
ogy so that different strategies use the same technology for 
different reasons. (3) Process technology appears to relate 
primarily to strategic dimensions concerning physical 
product characteristics, and very little to service 
dimensions. 
The existence of fit is demonstrated by highly 
significant differences in technology between groups, 
combined with the qualitative plausibility with which these 
differences appear to correspond to each strategic group. 
Although insufficient support was found for fit linked 
to performance (technology moderating strategic group 
membership’s impact on performance), results suggest that 
performance advantage from a technology is gained not in the 
group where it is most appropriate or a given, but in a 
group where it is also appropriate, but less widespread. 
VI 1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . v 
ABSTRACT  vi 
LIST OF TABLES  x 
LIST OF FIGURES  xii 
Chapter 
1 . INTRODUCTION . 1 
2. LITERATURE  5 
2.1 The Strategic Importance of Technology . 5 
2.2 Technology in General . 6 
2.3 Process Technology  8 
2.4 Flexibility versus Efficiency . 9 
2.5 Fit More Than Flexibility Versus Efficiency . 11 
2.6 Impact of Computer Controlled Technologies  12 
2.7 Empirical Research on Strategy-Process 
Technology  14 
2.8 Gap - Lack of Empirical Work on Fit . 16 
3. STRATEGY-PROCESS TECHNOLOGY MODEL  19 
3.1 Strategy  20 
3.2 Process Technology . 34 
3.3 The Concept of Fit  45 
3.4 Performance  48 
3.5 The Strategy-Process Technology Model . 49 
4. METHODS  52 
4.1 Hypotheses  52 
4.2 Sample  57 
4.3 Instrument . 60 
4.4 Data Collection  68 
4.5 Data Analysis  73 
5. RESULTS  94 
5.1 Hypothesis 1  94 
5.2 Hypothesis 2 . 102 
5.3 Hypothesis 3  105 
5.4 Hypothesis 4  109 
5.5 Summary of Results  123 
VI11 
TABLE OF CONTENTS, continued. 
6. DISCUSSION . 124 
6.1 The Nature of Fit . 124 
6.2 The Existence of Fit  128 
6.3 Fit Anchored to Performance . 128 
6.4 Exploration of Individual 
Technology-Performance Relationships . 130 
6.5 Generalizability of Findings  136 
6.6 Contribution to Current Research .. 149 
6.7 Implications and Suggestions for 
Future Research . 152 
7. CONCLUSION  156 
7.1 Summary of Findings  156 
7.2 Caveats and Limitations . 159 
7.3 Significance to Scholars, Practitioners, and 
Future Research .. 161 
APPENDICES 
A. SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE  164 
B. COVER LETTER  172 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  173 
IX 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
3.1 Strategic Grouping Dimensions . 35 
4.1 Size Distribution Data for Tooling and 
Machining Firms . 58 
4.2 Tooling and Machining Customers . 59 
4.3 Strategic Grouping Measures  62 
4.4 Technology Measures . 65 
4.5 Technology Factor Inter-Correlations . 77 
4.6 Technology Factors  78 
4.7 Strategy Factor Inter-Correlations . 82 
4.8 Strategy Factors . 83 
4.9 Strategy Factors and Theoretical Dimensions ... 85 
4.10 Mean Values of Cluster Centroids . 89 
5.1 Results of Hypothesis One . 96 
5.2 Strategy-Technology Factor Correlations . 98 
5.3 Results of Hypothesis Two . 104 
5.4 Technology Factor Means within 
Strategic Groups .  106 
5.5 Results of Hypothesis Three: MANOVA . 108 
5.6 Results of Hypothesis Three: ANOVA  109 
5.7 Results of Hypothesis Four: Model I . 114 
5.8 Results of Hypothesis Four: Model II . 116 
5.9 Results of Hypothesis Four: Model III . 118 
5.10 Results of Hypothesis Four: Model IV . 120 
6.1 Significant Within Groups Technology- 
Performance Relationships .. 130 
x 
LIST OF TABLES, continued. 
Table Page 
6.2 Strategic Groups and the Porter Typology . 142 
6.3 Strategic Groups and the Miles & Snow 
Typology . 143 
xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
3.1 Effects of High Product Range on Product 
Flexibility Under Conditions of 
Physical and Computer Integration ... 43 
3.2 Strategy-Process Technology Model  51 
4.1 Analysis for the Strategy-Process Technology 
Model . 74 
XI1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This decade has witnessed many calls proclaiming the 
importance of "technology" to firm strategy, and more 
generally to the relative strength of the world’s economies. 
While such references range from product technology, to 
information technology, to materials technology, a consider¬ 
able segment of the business literature has espoused the 
importance of appropriately using process or manufacturing 
technology to support competitive strategy (e.g., Hayes & 
Schmenner, 1978; Hayes and Wheelwright, 1979; Jelinek & 
Goldhar, 1983; Kantrow, 1980; Kotha & Orne, 1989; Schroeder, 
1990; Skinner, 1974, 1984; Wheelwright, 1984, 1978). This 
literature explicitly and implicitly suggests the importance 
of "fit" between firms’ process technology and competitive 
strategy. In such a relationship, a given process technol¬ 
ogy may or may not be appropriate for particular firms 
within an industry. 
The problems regarding this frequent assertion are that 
1) the nature of what constitutes fit is generally either 
too broadly or insufficiently specified, and 2) no statisti¬ 
cally validated research has shown such a contingency 
relationship to exist within an industry. Prior empirical 
research has shown that process technology changes predict- 
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ably over the course of product life-cycles (see Abernathy & 
Townsend, 1975), but has not focused on the appropriateness 
of a given process technology for different strategic 
positions at a point in time. The strategy-technology 
gestalts of Freeman (1974) and Miles & Snow (1978) make 
broad connections with efficient versus flexible processes 
but are experienced based (not broadly validated), and thus 
considered ’’conceptual” (Miller, 1988). Miller’s (1988 ) 
strategy-technology typology does include manufacturing 
technology in terms of batch, assembly line, and continuous 
process, but is derived from cross-industry data (PIMS) and 
thus has limited relevance to "fit” within an industry. 
Interesting connections between process technology and 
strategy have been observed in several industries (i.e., 
Schroeder, 1990; Schroeder, Gopinath, & Congden, 1989) but 
have not been validated statistically. This research gap is 
further elaborated in Chapter 2. 
While process technology-strategy research is recog¬ 
nized as important by both scholars and practitioners, 
performance issues are often overlooked. Kotha & Orne 
(1989) assert that the main research question regarding 
competitive strategy and manufacturing is to explore whether 
firms which exhibit "fit” or "congruence" among strategy and 
process technology outperform competitors without fit. At 
this point, scholars need to move beyond acknowledgment of a 
need for fit, to statistical demonstration that the concept 
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of fit exists and makes a difference in performance* . In 
the process, more would be learned about the nature of fit 
(e.g., which aspects are universal and which might be 
contingent on industry or other factors). Managers would be 
able to better co-align this core area of an organization 
with its domain by using successful firms with like strate¬ 
gies as a frame of reference to highlight differences in 
technology important to success. Potentially wasteful 
investment in inappropriate technology might be averted. 
Competitiveness promotion or attempts at industrial policy 
by policy makers would benefit to the extent that "new" 
technologies are not promoted for situations where inappro¬ 
priate . 
This dissertation empirically explores the nature, 
existence, and impact on performance of fit between process 
technology and competitive strategy. Due to the pervasive 
nature and wide variety of process technologies, focus is on 
one industry, the machining and tooling industry**. This 
allows thorough attention to the contingency question, and 
minimizes the impact of extraneous variables. Data gathered 
by mail questionnaires to members of the National Tooling 
* Strategy-Technology literature usage of "performance” 
is typically vague but tends toward "financial performance." 
This study also uses a financial conception, assessing 
performance in terms of profitability and growth. Chapter 
III reviews the basis for this choice. Chapter IV notes 
difficulties of measurement and interpretation. 
**See Chapter 4, section 4.2, for a description of the 
machining and tooling industry. 
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and Machining Association (NTMA) are analyzed to determine 
whether firms following different strategies use signifi¬ 
cantly different types of process technologies. If this fit 
is important as the literature suggests, firms following 
similar strategies should show significant variance in 
performance in relation to variation in their process 
technologies. Key strategic dimensions suggested by prior 
exploratory research on this industry (Schroeder, Gopinath, 
& Congden, 1989) as related to process technology are also 
tested to examine the nature of fit. 
This dissertation is organized around seven chapters. 
Chapter 1 has introduced the dissertation. Chapter 2 
reviews the literature to identify gaps, highlight areas 
which need more research, and demonstrate the role this 
research will play. Chapter 3 further explores the litera¬ 
ture to sort out ambiguities surrounding the major 
constructs of this research question. Definitions and a 
model appropriate for this dissertation’s questions are 
presented. Chapter 4 proposes specific hypotheses related 
to the model, and methodological procedures to test them. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of hypothesis testing. 
Chapter 6 discuses the results in relation to the litera¬ 
ture. Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of findings, 
followed by discussions of the limitations and the broader 
significance of the findings. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE 
This chapter examines the existing literature on 
strategy and process technology. It begins with recognition 
of technology’s strategic importance, and examination of 
generalized, broad natured research in which "technology” is 
used rather loosely. This is followed by a review of 
research which focuses specifically on the strategic 
importance of manufacturing technology. Traditionally, the 
strategic impact of process technology was seen as a trade¬ 
off between flexible and efficient processes. More recent¬ 
ly, manufacturing strategy literature has recognized a wider 
and more detailed range of dimensions where strategy and 
technology interact. However, research on computer 
controlled technologies reports changes in these relation¬ 
ships. The chapter ends with a review of empirical works on 
this topic, and concludes that a gap exists between 
normative claims of strategy-technology fit and empirical 
demonstration of the phenomena. 
2.1 The Strategic Importance of Technology 
The role of new technologies in altering the competi¬ 
tive structure of industries has long been recognized. 
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Schumpeter’s (1934) observation that innovation acts as a 
creatively destructive force which restructures industries, 
and thus the basic nature of competition, is typically cited 
as one of the early recognitions of the power in the link 
between competitive strategy and technological innovation. 
Porter (1983) warns that despite this recognition, the study 
of strategy and the study of technological innovation have 
too often been decoupled. He asserts that "...technological 
change is perhaps the single most important source of major 
market share changes among competitors [because it can 
change the competitive rules of the game]"(p3). 
2.2 Technology in General 
The importance of a company’s overall 'technology’ to 
its competitive strategy is well recognized by managers and 
scholars alike (Kantrow, 1980). Yet when examining this 
relationship, researchers confront challenges embedded in 
the very nature of technology. It is a broad concept 
affecting every facet of an organization and its dealings. 
Porter (1985), for example, notes that many different types 
of technology are embodied in the activities of every value 
stage of the organization. Technological leadership in 
these value stages (or followership depending on industry 
characteristics) can be used to support any of Porter’s 
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(1980) generic strategies (i.e. cost leadership, differenti¬ 
ation, or focus) (Porter, 1983). 
To deal with this pervasive nature, some scholars use 
typologies or taxonomies of strategy-technology gestalts to 
capture broad meta-relationships (e.g. Ansoff &. Stewart, 
1967; Freeman, 1974; Miles & Snow, 1978; Malekzadeh et al., 
1989; Miller, 1988). The resulting connections with process 
technology are quite generalized. Ansoff focuses solely on 
product technology while Freeman, Miles & Snow, and 
Malekzadeh et al. make only a very broad connection with 
process technology in the form of a distinction between 
efficient versus flexible processes. Miller’s taxonomy 
includes manufacturing technology in terms of Woodward’s 
(1965) categories of batch, assembly line, and continuous 
process. In an effort to identify global patterns, the 
cross-industry origins of these typologies and taxonomies 
(Miller’s taxonomy, for example, is PIMS based and the 
others are conceptual or experience based) sacrifices the 
depth of their usefulness, if not their validity in 
particular intra-industry settings. 
Much of the work relating 'technology’ to strategy only 
remotely deals with process technologies. Beginning with 
Ansoff & Stewart (1967), there is a strong research 
tradition examining the relationship between R&D to develop 
new product technologies, and market strategies (e.g., 
Foster, 1988; Frohman, 1982, 1985; Hariharan & Kazanjian, 
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1987; Harris, Shaw, & Sommers, 1984; Hoffmann, 1976; 
Hambrick et al., 1983; Ketteringham & White, 1984; Maidique 
& Patch, 1982; Petrov, 1982; Sethi et al., 1985). Because 
much of this work uses 'technology’ in a general sense, it 
may appear to be relevant to the more specific case of 
process technology. However, although the application of 
R&D know-how to processes is nominally recognized by some of 
these works, the predominant emphasis is on product develop¬ 
ment . 
2.3 Process Technology 
Concurrently, a significant vein of literature, much of 
it labeled "Manufacturing Strategy," has arisen from height¬ 
ened awareness of process or manufacturing technology’s 
direct relevance to competitive strategy. Skinner (1969) is 
often cited as an early voice for the strategic importance 
of process technology. In recent years, with the decline in 
U.S. manufacturing competitiveness, this area has received 
increasing attention. Japanese firms are said to have 
gained their lead in many industries through closely 
integrating manufacturing process technologies into their 
competitive strategies (Buffa, 1984; De Meyer et al., 1989; 
Jaikumar, 1986; Wheelwright, 1981). In addition, the advent 
of computer controlled process technologies promises 
striking implications for competitive strategy (Jelinek & 
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Goldhar, 1983). This dissertation likewise focuses on 
process technology. 
2.4 Flexibility versus Efficiency 
Perhaps the most prevalent or 'traditional’ view of the 
strategic role of process technology involved a trade-off 
between flexibility to produce different types or variations 
of products versus efficiency or low cost. A stream of 
research initiated by Abernathy (e.g., Abernathy, 1976; 
Abernathy & Townsend, 1975; Abernathy & Utterback, 1978) 
found that this trade-off in production processes evolves in 
a predictable pattern over a product’s life cycle. Initial¬ 
ly, when competition centers around product innovation, 
flexible, general purpose processes are required to accommo¬ 
date a variety of products and frequent design changes. 
Later, as products become standardized and volume increases, 
production systems become more dedicated (less flexible) in 
an effort to increase efficiency as it increasingly becomes 
the basis for competition. In the end, processes become 
complex, integrated, rigid, and capital intensive. Because 
processes become more intertwined and systematic, more 
costly major process innovations give way to increasingly 
incremental and minor change (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; 
Utterback, 1979). Hayes and Wheelwright (1979a,b) provide a 
clear way of viewing this pattern strategically by placing 
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the stages of the product life cycle and the process life 
cycle on sides of a matrix such that the diagonal represents 
the 'normal’ pattern of evolution. Operating "off diagonal" 
may result in a significant strategic disadvantage if not 
closely associated with an appropriate competitive strategy. 
This evolution of processes increases entry barriers in 
the form of capital intensive processes and large market 
share requirements. In addition, "because process innova¬ 
tions tend to reduce production costs, greater gains tend to 
accrue to holders of larger market shares" (Utterback, 1979, 
p. 52). Therefore, new entrants tend toward niche strate¬ 
gies by stressing uniqueness in product rather than 
competing on cost with process technology (Utterback, 1979). 
In focusing on the evolution of process technology 
within an industry, this product-process evolution research 
emphasizes the "sameness" in process technology of players 
in particular product-markets. It allows for some variation 
in that firms can lead the pack in pursuing low-cost 
efficiency, or lag the pack in retaining more flexibility 
and following differentiation or niche strategies. In sum, 
at any point in time, flexibility versus efficiency of 
processes seems to be the key strategic question raised by 
this research. 
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2.5 Fit More Than Flexibility Versus Efficiency 
Other works, in pointing out strategic impacts in 
addition to flexibility and low cost efficiency, implicitly 
recognize the differences in process technologies appropri¬ 
ate for different strategies at a point in time. Skinner’s 
(1974) idea of the "Focused Factory" is that manufacturing 
has to be focused around the needs of particular product- 
/market strategies. Dimensions on which manufacturing can 
perform are low costs, product quality, dependable delivery 
promises, short delivery cycles, flexibility to produce new 
products quickly, flexibility in adjusting to volume 
changes, and low investment. Others list similar subsets 
while adding product consistency (Hayes & Schmenner, 1978; 
Stobaugh & Telesio, 1983; Swamidass, 1987; Wheelwright, 
1984). Evidently, these authors see process technology 
playing a broader role than just low cost. Likewise, Porter 
(1983, 1985) asserts that, although the traditional view is 
that product innovation supports a differentiation strategy 
while process innovation supports a low cost strategy, 
examples can be found of process innovation supporting 
differentiation strategies. 
Inherent in this expanded view of the role of process 
technology is the idea that a given process technology might 
only be suitable for certain strategies. If machines and/or 
procedures are tailored to specific dimensions of strategy 
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such as delivery, quality, volume flexibility, etc., it 
stands to reason that they would be less than optimal with 
respect to other dimensions which might be chosen by 
competitors as a basis of strategic advantage. This is the 
rational behind ’’facilities focus” (Hill & Duke-Woolley, 
1983 ) and ’’focused factories" (Skinner, 1974, 1984). Other 
authors express the inability for given process equipment to 
serve the needs of too many strategic dimensions (Hayes & 
Schmenner, 1978; Stobaugh & Telesio, 1983; Wheelwright, 
1978). Terms such as "alignment," "consistency," "match," 
etc., imply the existence of a contingency nature "fit" 
between process technologies and competitive strategy. 
2.6 Impact of Computer Controlled Technologies 
The advent of computer controlled process technologies 
has also induced a more multifarious conception of the role 
of manufacturing technology, and has prompted authors to 
speculate on how the trade-off between flexibility and 
efficiency may be changing (Adler, 1988; Blois, 1985; De 
Meyer et al., 1989; Goldhar & Jelinek, 1983; Jelinek & 
Goldhar, 1983; Wheelwright, 1984; Meredith, 1987; Thompson & 
Paris, 1982; Voss, 1986). The main assertion is that 
computer controlled processes dramatically lower the cost of 
flexibility, making it nearly as efficient to manufacture 
product variations as it is to manufacture large volumes of 
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standard products. In some cases, economies of scope may 
actually make it cheaper to produce products in combination 
than separately (Jelinek & Goldhar, 1983). Jelinek & 
Goldhar (1983) assert that the approach of economic order 
(batch) quantities toward one piece works against the trend 
toward homogenization and commodity oriented, price based 
competition. Instead competition can be based on special 
options, custom products, etc. 
However, Jelinek and Goldhar (1983) warn that the low 
economic order quantity of computer controlled process 
technologies is only useful if it is part of a strategy 
catering to variety, customization, and frequent product 
changes. This is due to the significantly higher initial 
cost of computer controlled technologies. Jaikumar (1986) 
gives similar warnings of high start-up and learning costs 
in his comparison of U.S. and Japanese use of flexible 
manufacturing systems (FMS). These warnings imply a contin¬ 
gent nature fit in that strategies not taking advantage of 
these capabilities will suffer a penalty of unremunerated 
capital and/or learning costs. Although seldom explicitly 
acknowledged in the manufacturing strategy literature, this 
cost penalty is perhaps a primary countervailing factor 
which underlies the necessity of ’’fit". 
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2.7 Empirical Research on Strategy-Process Technology 
While numerous normative works argue for strategic uses 
of process technology, little empirical work has been done. 
Of empirical works which have been done, some have focused 
on single process technologies in single industries (e.g., 
Schott & Muller, 1975; Schroeder, 1990). Schott & Muller’s 
(1975) study of the international plastics trade found that, 
even with a mature process technology, competitive advantage 
was sustained where intensive process R&D led to continuous 
incremental process improvements. 
A longitudinal study by Schroeder (1990) found the 
strategic impact of a new process technology in the foundry 
industry to change over time due to the complex interaction 
of dynamic forces. The dynamics he identified were the 
diffusion of the innovation to potential users, the continu¬ 
ing evolution of the technology after its initial introduc¬ 
tion, and the development of complementary technologies. 
Schroeder did not find a relationship between different 
process technologies within the industry and the broad 
strategy types of Porter (1980) and Miles & Snow (1978). He 
did, however, find that the same new process technology 
could support different strategies, but it required adapta¬ 
tion and custom implementation to fit those purposes. He 
speculates that natural evolution in new process technol¬ 
ogies makes them increasingly flexible and able to serve 
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more strategies. Although this dissertation looks at fit in 
a cross section of time, Schroeder’s contribution serves to 
remind us that "fit" for a particular industry and/or 
process technology changes over time in a complex fashion. 
Several empirical studies have focused on the impact of 
new computer controlled process technologies. In a study of 
small British engineering firms, Dodgson (1987) finds that 
broader and higher skilled job roles are needed to achieved 
the greatest flexibility from CNC (computer numeric control) 
machine tools. Meredith (1987) asserts that small firms are 
really in as good, if not better, position to benefit from 
advanced computer controlled technologies than are larger 
firms because the technologies are most suited for support¬ 
ing strategies traditionally followed more effectively by 
smaller firms. 
In a longitudinal survey of the manufacturing strateg¬ 
ies of U.S., Japanese, and European firms, De Meyer et al. 
(1989) find that U.S. firms have retreated from earlier 
aggressive pursuit of computer integrated manufacturing to 
concentrate on basics such as quality. Japanese firms, 
having achieved quality, are investing heavily in computer 
controlled technologies as a means to overcome the tradeoff 
between cost-efficiency and flexibility. This finding 
appears to support the idea of flexible efficiency offered 
by computer controlled technologies. It does not, however, 
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demonstrate that this can be accomplished, only that it is a 
key goal of Japanese manufactures. 
Other empirical works are less directly related to 
strategy. For example, Swamidass and Newell ( 1987 ) find 
that more flexible manufacturing processes perform better in 
conditions of higher perceived environmental uncertainty, 
but they leave us with a gap between environmental 
uncertainty and competitive strategy. Ettlie, Bridges, & 
O’Keefe ( 1984) find that a ’’long range strategy for technol¬ 
ogical innovation” (p684) increases the likelihood that 
organizations will adopt radical (significantly different) 
process innovations, while a ’’market growth strategy" 
increases the likelihood that organizations will adopt 
incremental process innovations. Their study focuses on 
firm characteristics as related to adoption of particular 
types of process technology, and says little about appropri¬ 
ateness for given strategies. 
2.8 Gap - Lack of Empirical Work on Fit 
It is difficult and perhaps meaningless to draw lines 
between what is empirical work and what is not. Many of the 
normative works discussed have an empirical component in 
that assertions are based on, and illustrated with, case 
studies and the practical experience of the authors (e.g., 
Skinner, 1974, Jelinek & Goldhar, 1983; Wheelwright, 1978). 
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What can be said is that few if any works have tested 
propositions linking strategy and process technology, 
attempting to assess validity within an industry using 
statistical tests. Furthermore, although many scholars 
espouse the importance of fit between strategy and process 
technology, none have specified in adequate detail (beyond 
flexibility versus efficiency) what constitutes fit, and 
tested to see whether good fit directly relates to perform¬ 
ance. As Kotha & Orne (1989) assert, the main research 
question with regard to competitive strategy and manufactur¬ 
ing is to explore whether firms which exhibit "fit" or 
"congruence" among strategy and process technology outper¬ 
form competitors without fit. 
The shortage of empirical studies which specifically 
explore the linkages between competitive strategy and 
manufacturing technology indicates the need for more work in 
this important area. What we have so far is either only 
tangentially related, too narrow, or too broad. Single firm 
case studies and anecdotal illustrations certainly add to 
our understanding and help to develop theories, but it is 
hard to discern a satisfying whole or even a quasi-whole 
picture from a thousand points of light. On the other hand, 
broad, multi-industry endeavors result in only very general¬ 
ized conclusions. This appears to be a result of the 
broadness of both the technology and strategy typologies 
necessary for universal applicability. Ambiguities as to 
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what constitutes fit and what is meant by performance also 
add to the dilemma. The next chapter explores these 
constructs to derive a model which can begin to resolve the 
question of fit. 
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CHAPTER 3 
STRATEGY-PROCESS TECHNOLOGY MODEL 
To say that this study examines the impact on "perform¬ 
ance" of "fit" between "strategy" and "manufacturing tech¬ 
nology" is inadequate without further elaboration. One 
cannot begin to measure these constructs until their 
theoretical meaning is made clear. Literature usages of 
these terms vary widely depending on context. Even within 
contexts, such as within manufacturing strategy literature, 
usage is typically vague, with no definitions. Perhaps such 
ambiguity has inhibited empirical research in this area. 
This chapter examines, in order, each of the constructs 
strategy, process technology, fit, and performance. The 
literature surrounding each construct is probed to determine 
definitions most theoretically appropriate for this study. 
This consists of determining which of many possible under¬ 
lying dimensions capture the relevant essence of the 
construct and which approach to combining them is most 
relevant for this study. A model is then proposed which 
visually depicts the relationships between the constructs 
and which summarizes the construct usages chosen for this 
study. 
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3.1 Strategy 
This section first looks at different approaches to the 
strategy construct (universal, mid-range, and intra¬ 
industry), and narrows in on the one most appropriate for 
this study. Next the underlying dimensions which constitute 
the content of strategy are discussed with respect to their 
compatibility with the approach chosen and relevance to our 
research question. Finally, the dimensions chosen are 
outlined in Table 3.1. 
3.1.1 Global Approaches 
Strategy consists of the integration of so many dimen¬ 
sions that there are seemingly endless possible combinations 
(Hambrick, 1984). The traditional, cased-based approach has 
treated strategy formulation as a highly firm specific craft 
(for a discussion of, see Mintzberg, 1990). However, for 
research purposes, the complex, idiosyncratic nature of 
cases makes it difficult to identify and verify patterns 
which are important on a more general level. More recently, 
scholars have sought to reduce this confusion by searching 
for global, archetype configurations, or generic strategies, 
which are relevant across almost all firms. Perhaps the 
most widely acknowledged are the Miles & Snow (1978) typol¬ 
ogy and Porter’s (1980) generic strategies. 
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Although frequently employed in strategic management 
research, these universal strategy typologies appear to be 
too broad to adequately relate to process technology. The 
strategy typologies of Miles & Snow (1978) and Porter (1980) 
make only broad distinctions between efficiency and 
flexibility in appropriate process technologies. Assigning 
firms to Porter’s categories obscures different approaches 
to the generic strategies which the manufacturing strategy 
literature as well as Porter himself suggest. Competitive 
priorities such as quality, delivery, etc., professed by 
scholars as being pertinent to process technology (e.g., 
Skinner, 1974, 1984; Wheelwright, 1978; Hayes & Schmenner, 
1978; Stobaugh & Telesio, 1983) hint of strategy conceptions 
of finer detail. 
Examples of this inability to differentiate at a finer 
level have been found in several studies searching for links 
between strategy and process technology. In a study of the 
relationship between strategy and manufacturing technology 
in the foundry industry, Schroeder (1985) found generic 
strategy typologies inadequate. He identified three viable 
approaches to differentiation (Product Specialization, Value 
Added, and Customer Focus) as well as two combinations of 
these approaches. This observation parallels the manufac¬ 
turing strategy literature’s assertion of different 
strategic priorities such as different degrees of new 
product flexibility, service, etc. In addition, Schroeder 
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found two approaches to low cost strategies. One approach 
obtained low cost efficiency through high volume utilization 
of state-of-the-art manufacturing technologies, while the 
other obtained low cost primarily through low investment in 
inexpensive, mostly older technologies. This observation 
supports Skinner’s (1984) distinction between low cost and 
low investment strategic priorities. 
The inadequacy of universal typologies to address 
detail was also found in an exploratory study searching for 
links between process technology and strategy in the job 
shop machining, metal cutting tools, and plastic injection 
molding industries (Schroeder, Congden, & Gopinath, 1988). 
A generic strategy of "low cost" was observed to have 
tenuous meaning. Most firms reported low price as being 
most important, but this was clearly only with respect to 
other firms who had similar technological capabilities to 
compete in similar market segments. Given low price among a 
group of similar competitors, differentiation in the form of 
delivery, quality, service, etc. was important. Still other 
firms produced prototype or very customized products and had 
very close relationships with customers. Price became 
secondary to things such as service and design assistance. 
Overall, competition seemed to occur more within sub-groups 
than with the broader industry. 
It may be possible to shoehorn these observations into 
Porter’s strategy types but it is not clear that this is 
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sufficient. Refinements of Porter’s strategy types (Wright, 
1987), which demonstrate that industry-wide differentiation 
can co-exist with either focused differentiation or focused 
cost leadership in large firms, might allow an even better 
correspondence. However, questions remain. Is it mean¬ 
ingful to equate a firm which focuses on the needs of a 
particular local customer with a firm which serves many cus¬ 
tomers nationwide with a very narrow custom/precision orien¬ 
tation? Both would be classified as focus-differentiators 
but they hardly seem to be competing with "like" strategies. 
From the manager’s point of view, the more relevant 
strategic comparison is between more direct competitors. 
From this perspective, strategy might be better thought of 
as choice of market segment and competitive priorities on 
which to gain advantage within that market segment. 
In sum, universal typologies leave meaningful complex¬ 
ity unaccounted for. While it may not be possible for a 
generic level typology to deal with such detail, particular 
strategic dimensions may nonetheless be key in particular 
industries and/or with regard to particular process technol¬ 
ogies. Harrigan (1983) agrees with this, and argues that 
"coarse grained," cross-industry studies can make only 
limited distinctions between strategies within a particular 
industry. She points out the need for "mid-range" research 
that addresses one or a limited number of industries so that 
richer insight is gained as well as some generalizability. 
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3.1.2 Mid-Range Approaches 
Hambrick (1984) appears to follow Harrigan’s (1983) 
mid-range proposal when he suggests delimiting research to 
specific strategic environments. He asserts that because 
the contingency perspective is a key precept of strategy, 
taxonomic research (specifically cluster analysis) to 
identify strategy archetypes should be done within specified 
strategic environments. Like Miles & Snow, Hambrick sees 
strategy as a "gestalt" of interdependent strategic choices, 
any one of which might relate to performance differently 
within the context of different strategic gestalts. 
Hambrick’s application of cluster analysis (1983b) to 
higher performing firms in two strategic environments 
("disciplined capital goods makers" and "aggressive makers 
of complex capital goods," - also developed with cluster 
analysis; Hambrick, 1983a) results in strategy types which 
he concludes are comparable with variations to Porter’s and 
Miles & Snow’s strategy types. He labels them "Pure cost 
leadership," "Asset-conscious focuser" (comparable to a 
focus strategy), and three differentiation type strategies, 
"Quality-based gendarme," "Broad-based differentiation," and 
"Prospector". While still rather broad, Hambrick’s strategy 
types demonstrate strategy refinements, such as different 
approaches to differentiation, derived from a narrower 
focus. 
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Stilly Hambrick’s environments or "industries” go 
beyond what most firms would consider relevant competitors. 
Given the importance of analyzing competitive strategy at 
the intra-industry level (Porter, 1980), perhaps an industry 
focus is needed for the question of strategy-technology fit. 
Intra-industry research would provide an appropriate 
theoretical context for investigating "fit" as well as a 
finer focus from which new linkages appropriate for more 
detailed but generalizable frameworks might emerge. Intra¬ 
industry research also overcomes the limitation of research¬ 
ers becoming sufficiently versed in the process technology 
choices for variety of industries. 
3.1.3 Intra-Industry Approaches 
Within an industry, the concept of strategic groups 
offers a useful, intermediate analytical framework between a 
case approach and cross-industry strategic analysis (Porter, 
1980). Roughly speaking, strategic groups are composed of 
firms with similar strategies within a specific industry 
(Porter, 1980; Harrigan, 1985). Porter (1980) says that his 
generic strategies are really just generalized types of 
strategic groups that are viable in most industries. 
While the emergence of the concept of strategic groups 
is credited to work by Hunt (1972), Caves & Porter (1977) 
offered the first clear set of rationale for the phenomena 
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in the form of mobility barriers. Mobility barriers are 
structural forces which impede firms from changing competi¬ 
tive position and thus prevent the coalescence of industry 
participants into virtually the same competitive posture 
(Caves & Porter, 1977). In reviewing works on strategic 
groups, McGee & Thomas (1986) classify the sources of 
mobility barriers as market related strategies, industry 
supply characteristics, and firm characteristics. They 
argue that mobility barriers reflect the strategic decisions 
of the firm and are a way of defining the set of key strate¬ 
gies available to the firm. Consistent with Porter’s advice 
(1980), much strategic group research has differentiated 
groups on various ’’strategic dimensions” which are difficult 
to change or imitate, and are thus mobility barriers for the 
industry in question. 
Because one would expect differences in relative 
advantage afforded by the barriers and structure of various 
groups, such research has predominantly concentrated on the 
existence of and performance differences associated with 
strategic groups (Cool & Schendel, 1988). The term 
’’Strategic Groups" was coined by Hunt ( 1972 ) to explain 
performance variation in the 'white goods’ industry. He 
observed four groups separated by differences in vertical 
integration, product diversification, and product differen¬ 
tiation. While other early work also demonstrated existence 
of strategic groups (e.g., Newman, 1973; Porter, 1973; 
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Hatten, 1974; Patton, 1976), their part in explaining 
performance differences within an industry has been mixed. 
Some have found support for performance differences across 
groups (Hunt, 1972; Newman, 1973; Oster, 1982; Fiegenbaum & 
Thomas, 1990), others mixed or non-significant results 
(Porter, 1973; Dess & Davis, 1984) and others, no support 
(Frazier & Howell, 1983; Cool & Schendel, 1987; Lawless, 
1987). One study (Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989) found profita¬ 
bility differences across groups attributable to the inter¬ 
action of competitive forces such as customer and supplier 
power, and mobility barriers. 
A few recent studies have taken a different approach by 
accounting for individual firm factors which cause perform¬ 
ance variance within strategic groups. Such factors 
"moderate” the relationship between strategic group member¬ 
ship and performance. Cool & Schendel (1988) examined 
differences in "accumulated assets" of firms within 
strategic groups as an explanation of within groups perform¬ 
ance variance in the pharmaceutical industry. Improper 
accumulated assets, which increase risk depending on the 
nature of the environmental change for an industry, corre¬ 
lated negatively with performance. They offer this as one 
of many theoretically possible moderators in the strategic 
group - performance relationship. Lawless et al. (1988) 
analyzed firms from four similarly structured industries by 
looking at individual firm "capabilities" as a moderator of 
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the effect of strategic group members’ shared strategy 
characteristics on performance. Capabilities in this study 
were reflected in financial stock measures such as liquid¬ 
ity, leverage, and activity. Using strategic groupings 
based on Porter’s (1980) descriptions of low cost and 
differentiation strategies, Lawless et al. (1988) found 
capabilities to positively correlate with performance within 
each strategic group. They conclude that a model with 
"capability to carry out a strategy" as a moderator might 
improve consistency in the strategic group - performance 
research. 
While these two studies did not actually test for 
interaction between the moderator and strategic group 
membership as their theory implied, they do suggest the 
appropriateness of the strategic group approach for this 
study. In this study, process equipment technologies can be 
viewed as either "accumulated assets" or "capabilities" of 
each firm which moderate the impact of strategy on perform¬ 
ance. While the strategic group-performance model is not 
the focus of this study, perhaps some light might also be 
shed on this model. 
The relevance of strategic grouping for this study lies 
in its usefulness for measuring strategy. First, as 
Harrigan (1985) notes, single industry study was the 
original spirit of strategic group analysis (i.e., Hunt, 
1972; Newman, 1973; Hatten, 1974). Secondly, classification 
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(typology or taxonomy) such as strategic grouping on a 
number of dimension is appropriate because it recognizes the 
interdependencies of variables or gestalts (Harrigan, 1985). 
While bivariate grouping emphasizes similarities and narrows 
the focus prematurely, multivariate approaches such as 
cluster analysis preserve information, as it is often the 
differences within groups which are important (Hatten & 
Hatten, 1987). Although Porter’s generic strategies may be 
properly thought of as gestalts (Harrigan, 1985), they, like 
bi-variate mapping, reduce information prematurely. 
3.1.4 Underlying Strategy Dimensions 
A key question facing researchers is what dimensions 
should be used in grouping firms (McGee & Thomas, 1986; Cool 
& Schendel, 1987, 1988; Fiegenbaum, et al, 1987). This is 
more than a methodological issue because the dimensions 
chosen determine the conceptual nature of a particular 
grouping. There are certainly many to choose from. Porter 
(1980) lists thirteen dimensions along which strategic 
groups can be differentiated, including channel selection, 
product quality, vertical integration, cost position, 
service, etc. From a thorough review of strategic group 
studies, McGee & Thomas (1986) classify differentiating 
dimensions as market related strategies, industry supply 
characteristics, and firm characteristics. These categories 
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are quite broad, including manufacturing processes, size, 
organizational structure, etc. In short, most character¬ 
istics of a firm can be argued to be the result of some 
strategic choice, and a mobility barrier of significance in 
some particular industries. 
Perhaps this dilemma leads Cool & Schendel (1987, 1988) 
to assert that appropriateness depends on the specific 
industry being studied. They propose that at a minimum, 
dimensions specifying firms’ scope and resource commitments 
are needed. Scope or domain commitments consist of 1) range 
of market segments targeted, 2) types of products or 
services offered, and 3) geographic reach. Resource commit¬ 
ments refer to priorities in outlays to functional areas 
which are key to competitive advantage in the targeted 
segment. Scope and resource commitments parallel McGee & 
Thomas’ ( 1986) "market related strategies” and ’’supply 
characteristics.” McGee & Thomas’ ’’characteristics of 
firms” (e.g. size, organizational structure, management 
skills) appear more remote to the realm of competitive 
strategy. 
This broad perspective poses a dilemma for this study. 
If process technology is relatively important to an indus¬ 
try, can it be treated as separate from strategy or is it 
part of strategy? Process technology could be considered a 
’resource commitment’ or ’supply characteristic,’ a 
strategic dimension on which to define strategies, rather 
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than to juxtapose with strategy as this study attempts. 
Strategic group rationale calls for grouping on dimensions 
which are mobility barriers; indeed Mascarenhas & Aaker 
( 1989) assert that ’’group definition should be driven by 
mobility barriers, exit and entry barriers between strategic 
groups, rather than strategies” (p475). Manufacturing 
technology is a likely mobility barrier for many industries 
and thus should be part of strategy from the strategic group 
perspective. 
However, one can also argue that process technology and 
strategy should be separated for the research question 
pursued here. First, there is no practical way to test for 
fit if they are not separated. This study’s question could 
be framed as one resource commitment (manufacturing technol¬ 
ogy) needing to be consistent with scope commitments and 
other resource commitments. This perspective is compatible 
with the literature on manufacturing technology and 
strategy, but does not offer an objective way to judge fit. 
One could only evaluate the fit between process technology 
and other strategic dimensions by subjectively comparing 
observed relationships within a gestalt to theoretical, 
bivariate relationships (Venkatramen, 1989). The interac¬ 
tion of dimensions, which is key to the gestalt concept, is 
difficult to judge. 
Second, the manufacturing strategy literature which 
poses the question for this study does not use "strategy" in 
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such a comprehensive way. While the strategic grouping 
perspective includes every conceivable choice dimension, the 
manufacturing strategy literature generally uses strategy to 
mean current product-market strategy. Wheelwright (1984) 
provides the best summary of this usage by defining strategy 
as first, the choice of product-market segment to compete 
in, and second, the choice of competitive priority (e.g., 
quality, delivery, cost, service, etc.) to emphasize in 
order to attain advantage in the chosen market segment. 
Empirical support has been found for this conceptualization 
for use in strategy-technology research (Schroeder et al., 
1989). This more restricted conceptualization still lends 
itself to strategic grouping methodologies such as cluster 
analysis within a single industry, but allows fit with 
technology to be evaluated. The question addressed is 
simply "Is technology consistent with current product-market 
strategy?" 
Another consideration in choosing strategic grouping 
dimensions concerns current strategy versus strategic 
position, which is more a reflection of past strategic 
choices. Mascarenhas & Aaker (1989) assert that strategic 
grouping should focus not on strategic activities - "what we 
do," but on firm assets and skills, "what we are" (p484). 
Other strategic group research recognizes this issue but 
advocates a current strategy approach (Cool & Schendel, 
1988; Lawless et al., 1988). Cool & Schendel (1988) reason 
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that a firm’s "stock of accumulated assets" constrains the 
effectiveness of current strategy or "flow" decisions. 
Firms grouped as similar in current strategy may differ in 
performance due to differences in appropriateness of accumu¬ 
lated assets. Lawless et al. (1988) use the same approach 
where profit performance is a "function of strategic group 
membership based on similarity in strategy, or flow 
variables, and firm capabilities, or stock variables" (p9). 
The current strategy approach makes sense for this 
study. Process technology is an accumulated asset or stock 
variable which constrains the effectiveness of other aspects 
of current strategy. Application, however, is less clear 
cut. Cool & Schendel’s (1988) "current strategy" grouping 
includes several dimensions which appear to be stock 
variables such, as cumulative R&D capital stock. Perhaps 
measures of the cumulative manifestations of past decisions 
are sometimes used as surrogates for current strategy where 
the alternative is forfeiture of important information. 
3.1.5 Approach and Dimensions Chosen for this Study 
The approach to strategy assessment taken by this study 
is an intra-industry perspective using strategic grouping 
techniques. Given the importance of current product-market 
strategy to our question, the strategic content of our model 
should include dimensions related to products, markets, and 
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current strategic priorities as suggested by the manufactur¬ 
ing strategy literature as important (i.e. product quality, 
dependability, and consistency; volume and new product 
flexibility; quick and dependable delivery; low cost, and 
low investment (Hayes & Schmenner, 1978; Skinner, 1974, 
1984; Stobaugh & Telesio, 1983; Swamidass, 1987; 
Wheelwright, 1984). Including Porter’s dimensions covers 
products and market segments, and adds thoroughness to 
coverage of the strategy concept. Cool & Schendel’s scope 
and resource commitment guidelines should be taken into 
consideration as a check. Table 3.1 shows the conceptual 
overlap of the strategic dimensions from the literatures 
noted above, and offers construct labels for use in this 
study. 
3.2 Process Technology 
Although ’’process technology" can be broadly defined to 
include the know-how, procedures, and hardware used in a 
firm’s conversion process, literature usages predominately 
vary between emphasis on hardware or machines, and the 
procedures or the nature of the human activities which 
involve the machines. Know-how or scientific knowledge 
aspects are seldom emphasized, much of it presumedly 
embedded in machines and procedures. This study is 
implicitly more oriented toward hardware than procedures 
34 
Table 3.1 
Strategic Grouping Dimensions 
1. Product Characteristics Types of product offered [C&S]* 
Product quality, consistency, & 
dependability [MfLit] 
Product quality, brand identifi¬ 
cation [Port] 
2. Product Variability ■ Flexibility to make new products 
quickly [MfLit] 
■ Technological leadership [Port] 
Width of product line [Port] 
3. Target Markets • Range of market segments 
targeted [C&S] 
Target customer segments [Port] 
4. Geographic Range ■ Geographic reach [C&S] 
■ Geographic markets served [Port] 
5. Service Priorities • Ancillary services [Port] 
• Short delivery cycles; dependable 
delivery promises [MfLit] 
6. Price Policy ■ Price Policy [Port] 
7. Operating Efficiency ■ Low cost [MfLit] 
■ Low cost position through cost 
minimizing equipment [Port] 
8. Low Overhead ■ Low investment [MfLit] 
• Low cost position through cost 
minimizing facilities [Port] 
9. Value Stage Participation ■ Resource commitments to key 
functional areas [C&S] 
■ Vertical Integration [Port] 
10. Output Variability - Flexibility to adjust to volume 
fluctuations [MfLit] 
11. Distribution ■ Choice of distribution channels 
[Port] 
*[C&S] = Cool & Schendel (1987); 
Manufacturing strategy literature 
[Port] = Porter (1980); [MfLit] = 
(i.e. Skinner, 1974; Hayes & 
Schmenner, 1978; Stobaugh & Telesio, 1983; Swamidass, 1987; Wheelwright, 
1984). 
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(although the nature of either are quite interrelated) as 
this appears to be usage of process technology in most of 
the manufacturing strategy literature. It is also much more 
easily documented from a research perspective. 
Given the importance of analyzing competitive strategy 
at the intra-industry level (Porter, 1980), differentiation 
of processes technologies within industries is needed. Yet 
characterization of process technology has not moved beyond 
the categories of job shop, batch, assembly line, and 
continuous flow (found in the works of Hayes & Wheelwright, 
1979a; Abernathy and Townsend, 1975; Woodward, 1965). These 
types are too broad for meaningful use within industries. 
For example, the processes of all firms within a given 
industry might be ’’assembly lines” in a broad sense. 
Assumedly assembly lines vary on degree of flexibility, yet 
these typologies do not permit such differentiation. 
Even such a differentiation is still fairly general. 
Many adjectives such as flexible, general purpose, uncoordi¬ 
nated, segmental, dedicated, complex, systemic, integrated, 
rigid, capital intensive, etc., are used to describe 
technology, but usage has stressed the unidimensional and 
unidirectional nature of technology (e.g., Abernathy, 1976; 
Abernathy & Townsend, 1975; Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; 
Hayes & Wheelwright, 1979a). Kotha and Orne (1989) do 
propose three underlying dimensions of mechanization, 
systemization, and interconnectedness, but see them as co- 
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varying such that a unidimensional typology based on "system 
complexity" results, the same dimension underlying Woodward 
(1965) and others’ scales (Fry, 1982). Perhaps the apparent 
unidirectionality of these underlying dimensions results 
from efforts to generalize across industries. 
Although these broad technology typologies are too 
generalized for use within an industry, there may be 
important conceptual dimensions that can be gleaned from 
them. Kotha and Orne’s (1989) approach of characterizing 
process technologies by a number of underlying dimensions 
offers promise in establishing finer linkages. Perhaps 
their dimensions can be refined and added to such that most 
process technologies can be characterized by a combination 
of scores on these dimensions. 
To begin examining such a course, it is useful to 
review the usage of the term "technology" by literature 
espousing the strategic importance of process technology. 
Much of this literature focuses only on computer controlled 
manufacturing technologies, although fit is conceivably 
relevant to a myriad of different process technologies. The 
distinctions range from "new versus old" (Blois, 1985; 
Meredith, 1987; Adler, 1988; Voss, 1986; Skinner, 1984), to 
"advanced versus conventional" (Dodgson, 1985), to "compu¬ 
terized versus non-computerized (Jelinek & Goldhar, 1983; 
Majchrzak et al., 1986), and even "post industrial, infor¬ 
mation intensive" (Jaikumar, 1986). Striking strategic 
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implications (see Jelinek & Goldhar, 1983) might make this a 
worthy central focus of study. 
However, despite this attention to computerized versus 
conventional process technologies, a more generalized and 
timeless approach would be to assess technologies along 
establish dimensions that can be combined to characterize 
these technologies. Even though dimensions such as "automa¬ 
tion" have typically been applied on a cross industry basis 
as discussed above, one would expect that technology options 
within an industry can be differentiated on the same dimen¬ 
sion, albeit a finer scale. The following subheadings 
relate to discussion of important underlying conceptual 
dimensions of process technology to be captured by this 
study. The chosen dimensions are also summarized in Figure 
3.2. 
3.2.1 Automation and Integration 
A number of dimensions for assessment of technology are 
possible. The study of organization structure in relation 
to technology beginning with Woodward (1965) has resulted in 
measures such as automation and integration (Hickson et al., 
1969; Child & Mansfield, 1972), changeability (Aiken & Hage, 
1971), and scale (Blau, 1972; Collins & Hull, 1986). 
Automation and integration appear most relevant for this 
research. 
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Increased automation and integration is traditionally 
associated with process complexity, and less flexibility to 
produce a variety of products (Abernathy & Townsend, 1975; 
Hayes & Wheelwright, 1979a,b). However, computer controlled 
technologies disrupt this co-variation, and confound what is 
meant by automation and integration (Gerwin, 1981). 
Research has generally tended to use variations on Amber & 
Amber’s (1962) scale of automation (e.g., Hickson et al., 
1969; Collins, Hage, & Hull, 1988; Kotha & Orne, 1989) in 
which automation progresses from hand tools, to powered 
machines, to self-feeding, single cycle automatics, to 
automatics which repeat cycle (usually by mechanical or 
pneumatic devices), to self-measuring and adjustment, which 
these authors use to mean computer programmable technol¬ 
ogies. But with programmable processes, automation no 
longer clearly inversely co-varies with flexibility. 
Jelinek & Goldhar’s (1983) typology of independent tools and 
methods, programmable systems, flexible systems, and 
dedicated systems reflects decreasing flexibility, and thus 
places computer controlled systems before dedicated systems. 
Spur & Mertins (1981) present the same scale but in hardware 
terminology: stand alone NC machine tools, flexible manufac¬ 
turing cell, flexible manufacturing systems, flexible 
transfer lines, and fixed transfer lines. Fixed transfer 
line corresponds to Jelinek & Goldhar’s dedicated systems in 
that it consists of special purpose machines for a specific 
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product, changeable only after considerable set up time 
(which by default seems to be mechanical, electro-mechani¬ 
cal, or pneumatic control automation). 
In these last two scales, increasing integration 
results in decreasing flexibility. High automation (more 
computer control) together with high integration results in 
high process complexity which is less flexible (Kotha & 
Orne, 1989). However, Kotha & Orne (1989) also assert (as 
does Farley et al., 1987) that increased integration may 
make computer controlled technologies more flexible. 
Perhaps this apparent dilemma is due to imprecise use 
of the term ’’flexibility." One possible type of flexibility 
is the ability to continuously take on the production of new 
products. Another is the ability to switch production back 
and forth between existing products. This second flexibil¬ 
ity comes from low set up times, and is the hallmark of JIT 
(see Ohno, 1982). This distinction is not clearly made in 
most uses of ’flexibility’ (e.g "variety of parts to made by 
the production system" - Jelinek & Goldhar, 1983; "number of 
different variants" - Spur & Mertins, 1981). 
A case can be made for two types of integration which 
relate differently to these two types of flexibility: 
physical versus computer integration. Physical integration 
in pure form would be physical links such as materials 
handling equipment and work cells (physical grouping of 
different machines for specific products). This is the 
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fixed transferline or rigid, systematic production system of 
Abernathy & Townsend (1975). Computer integration might 
also be termed electronic integration, and would refer to 
the electronic linking of different computer processing 
units or controls. Physical integration would likely 
inhibit the introduction of new products and the switching 
of existing products. Different jigs or machine arrange¬ 
ments might conceivably be needed for either type of 
product. Computer integration may also inhibit new product 
flexibility due to the cost of more complex programming of a 
larger network of computer controls to handle the processing 
and sequencing of a new part. Once programmed however, 
(i.e. now an existing product) switching back and forth 
between different products can be done quite quickly, with 
the touch of an electronic button. 
A confounding factor is the "differentness" or "range" 
(size and processing requirements) of the variety of 
products to be produced. Outside the designed product 
range, computer integrated manufacturing systems are very 
inflexible (Blois, 1985). Unfortunately many works on 
computer controlled flexibility (e.g. Farley et al., 1987; 
Spur & Mertins, 1981; Jelinek & Goldhar, 1983; Kotha & Orne, 
1989) do not discuss the nature of the different parts to be 
produced. 
Conceptually sorting out the interaction of physical 
and computer integration, range of products, and new and 
41 
existing product flexibility is difficult. Perhaps physical 
integration and the physical range of machines would be 
better labeled degree of "general purposeness." One can 
perhaps hypothesize that high new or existing product range 
(differences in processing requirements) has less negative 
impact on flexibility if process equipment is general 
purpose as opposed to dedicated. Dedicated, highly specific 
processes are either unable to handle very different new 
products and/or lots of adjustments and special tooling will 
be needed to switch production to very different existing 
products. Stated another way, new and existing product 
flexibility will be more adversely affected by high product 
range when processes are highly specific. 
High existing product range should have little impact 
on flexibility for either low or high computer integration. 
Once programmed, it is just as easy to switch back and forth 
between highly different programs. High range in new 
products would have more of an impact (negative) on flexi¬ 
bility for high computer integration as opposed to low 
computer integration. Initial programming for a complex, 
integrated system would likely be more difficult and/or time 
consuming if the parameters of the new product were quite 
different from other products due to less learning curve 
benefits and/or sharing of program sub-routines. 
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The relative effects of product range and integration 
on flexibility just described are summarized below in Figure 
3.1 below: 
Integration 
Physical 
Low High 
Computer 
Low High 
High Old 
Product 
Range 
High New 
Product 
Range 
Relative 
Effect On: 
D> 
> 
Existing 
Product 
Flexibility 
New Product 
Flexibility 
* Note: The double arrows indicates that comparison of impact magnitude 
is only relevant within a pair. The relative impact magnitude across 
the chart is uncertain. 
Figure 3.1 
Effects of High Product Range on Product Flexibility 
Under Conditions of Physical and Computer Integration 
In these tentative relationships, high product range is 
seen as differentially moderating the impact of integration 
(physical or computer) on flexibility (new or existing 
product). In most situations, physical and computer aspects 
are mixed making the prediction of outcomes very difficult. 
In addition, these constructs are tentative. It may turn 
out that physical and computer integration almost always 
strongly co-vary. However, work cells is physical integra¬ 
tion that seems to have little to do with computer integra¬ 
tion. A DNC network (downloading programs to individual 
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machine tools via a centralized computer network) is at 
least one case of computer integration that seems unrelated 
to physical integration. 
Given the uncertainty surrounding the constructs just 
discussed, and the ambiguity of the literature treatment of 
flexibility, integration, and computer and mechanical 
automation, it may be difficult to extract these constructs 
in isolation. However, this discussion has shown that 
measures of computer and mechanical integration, product 
range, and new versus existing (repeat) products, may be 
important in relating technology to strategy. Factor 
analysis may reveal empirical overlap. This is consistent 
with the objective of examining the nature of fit. 
3.2.2 Range of Capabilities 
Not every process technology has the same breadth of 
capabilities. Capability to handle a variety of part sizes 
was alluded to above. This "general purposeness" in 
physical range applies to major process equipment (such as 
machine tools) as well as connecting equipment. It is 
conceptually different from integration although usually 
negatively related in practice. For example, the integra¬ 
tion of Abernathy & Townsend (1975) is associated with 
dedicated systems with less range for new products. 
Integration in a pure sense restricts flexibility because of 
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process flow patterns that are difficult to adjust or change 
for different products. However, within a particular 
integration pattern, connecting conveyors, pallet changers, 
or robots themselves have a physical range or degree of 
specificity for the parts they can handle. 
Range of capabilities can also include things other 
than physical range such as range of precision and range of 
movement. CNC machine tools vary in number of axes (direc¬ 
tion) of machining movement. Some parts cannot be made 
without the complex shaping movements allowed by greater 
number of axes. 
Greater range allows firms to produce products of a 
broader size or configuration range. A firm in the machin¬ 
ing and tooling industry reported that it used machines just 
adequate for the job rather than more costly "cadillac 
models" with many extra features which just add to the cost 
(Schroeder et al., 1988). This dimension should capture 
some of the cost/benefit tradeoff given the higher cost of 
multi-capability manufacturing technologies. 
3.3 The Concept of Fit 
Venkatramen & Camillus (1984) have described the 
concept of "fit" in strategic management as essentially 
specifying contingency relationships in matching various 
components related to strategy. However, the usages of fit 
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can vary depending on whether a content or a process 
conceptualization is used, and on whether the external 
and/or internal domain is addressed (Venkatramen & Camillus, 
1984). In such a framework, this dissertation research 
belongs to what Venkatramen & Camillus call the "Strategy 
Implementation School" because it focuses on the content 
issues of the alignment of internal factors. In this study, 
the alignment is between strategy and process technology. 
In a later work, Venkatramen (1989) reviews various 
theoretical usages of fit and discusses analytical issues 
appropriate to each. He sees six types of fit, varying in 
degree to which the relationship’s functional form is 
specified, and whether fit is anchored to a particular 
criterion such as performance. This study will conceptual¬ 
ize fit in two of these ways. 
First, fit will be conceptualized as "gestalts" 
(Venkatramen, 1989), a limited set of viable combinations of 
strategy and technology dimensions. If "fit" between 
process technology and strategy is important, variations in 
technology within an industry should coalesce around differ¬ 
ent strategic positions, each of which maximizes the 
advantages of its particular process technology. Over time, 
firms which least take strategic advantage of their process 
technology either fail, change strategies, or change process 
technology. An interpretable pattern of significant tech¬ 
nology differences between groups would be evidence of such 
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a process. This conception of fit is not directly linked to 
a criterion such as firm performance, although performance 
in the broad sense of survival is assumed to be manifest in 
current strategy-technology patterns. 
Second, fit will also be conceptualized as "moderation" 
(Venkatramen, 1989), in which process technology moderates 
the relationship between strategy and performance. Accumu¬ 
lated technology which is less appropriate for a particular 
strategy or strategic group should result in higher risk and 
poorer performance. This is conceptually consistent with 
work by Cool & Schendel (1988) and Lawless et al. (1988) in 
which appropriateness of accumulated assets or capabilities, 
respectively, moderate (at the firm level) the relationship 
between strategic group membership and financial perform¬ 
ance . 
This study will examine both conceptions of fit. Fit 
as a gestalt gives us a basic indication of alignment 
between strategy and technology. Fit as moderation is what 
Venkatramen calls "criterion-specific" because fit is 
manifested as correlation between the criterion (perform¬ 
ance) and the interaction of moderator (technology) and 
predictor (strategy) variables. As such, this conception of 
fit is perhaps the more powerful by requiring that fit be 
related to the bottom line of firm performance. 
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3.4 Performance 
As the time test any strategy, performance is an issue 
that strategy researchers cannot avoid. (Schendel & Hofer, 
1979). Cameron (1980) identifies four broad conceptualiza¬ 
tions: (1) Goals - attainment of explicit organizational 
goals (e.g. Etzioni, 1964), (2) Systems - organizations as 
natural systems, ability to obtain resources, survive, grow 
(e.g. Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967), (3) Internal Processes - 
smooth, integrated, controlled, harmonious, internal 
processes (e.g., Steers, 1977), and (4) Constituents - 
satisfaction of stakeholders, internal and external (e.g., 
Thompson, 1967). Cameron notes that all have flaws, and 
appropriateness depends on the situation. 
Strategic management research appears to prefer quanti¬ 
tative measures, such as financial and operational data. A 
survey of performance measures in strategic management 
research found fourteen quantitative measures typically used 
(Woo & Willard, 1983). Factor analysis revealed four under¬ 
lying factors: profitability (highest factor magnitude), 
relative market position, change in profitability and cash 
flow, and growth in sales and market share. Chakravarthy 
(1986) used Peters & Waterman’s (1982) and Fortune rankings 
of computer firms to test accounting measures, financial 
market indicators, and composites such as Z factors (Altman, 
1971; Argenti, 1976). He concluded they were inadequate. 
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He derived his own discriminant function from measures 
(financial and operational, - much the same as those 
identified by Woo & Willard) of "adaptive specialization" 
(exploiting current environment) and "adaptive generaliza¬ 
tion" (improving or investing to meet uncertain environ¬ 
ments). He concludes that his function measures ability to 
generate slack resources (e.g. profitability), and investing 
this slack in the future (e.g. R&D). In Chakravarthy’s 
work, one sees elements of the constituent conceptualization 
(profitability for stockholders) and the systems conceptual¬ 
ization (slack resources, ability to survive). 
Our proposed model will use a systems conceptualiza¬ 
tion, which includes the ability to generate slack resources 
(profitability) and the ability to grow (sales growth). 
This conceptualization is chosen because most of the litera¬ 
ture which suggests performance implications for technology- 
strategy fit refers to or implies profit performance (Kotha 
& Orne, 1989). In addition to theory and/or precedent, 
there are certainly pragmatic reasons to chose a particular 
conceptualization, which depend on the industries studied or 
the nature of the study. 
3.5 The Strategy-Process Technology Model 
The Strategy-Process Technology Model presented in 
Figure 3.2 visually summarizes the underlying dimensions 
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discussed in this chapter and chosen for this study, as well 
as the hypothesized relationships between the constructs. 
Process technology consists of the underlying dimensions of 
automation, physical integration, computer integration, and 
range of capabilities. Strategy consists of groups of firms 
which have relatively similar product characteristics and 
product variability, similar target markets within a similar 
geographic range, similar service priorities and price 
policies, and similar positions on strategic dimensions of 
operating efficiency, overhead, value stage participation, 
output variability, and distribution. Different dimensions 
might be relatively more important depending on the industry 
context. Performance is primarily a combination of profit¬ 
ability and growth. 
In this model, the interaction or ’’fit" (as moderation) 
between process technology has an impact on firm financial 
performance beyond or in addition to that of strategy and 
process technology by themselves. Another way of stating 
this is that process technology moderates the relationship 
between strategic group membership and performance. Being 
in a strong, high performing strategic group may not auto¬ 
matically provide high returns for a firm in that group if 
its technology does not provide necessary capabilities with 
reasonable cost effectiveness. 
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Figure 3.2 
Strategy-Process Technology Model 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODS 
This chapter presents the methods used to test the 
model of strategy-process technology fit presented at the 
end of Chapter 3. The U.S. tooling and machining industry 
was selected as a test environment for reasons discussed 
later. 
This chapter starts by presenting four hypotheses used 
to test the model. Following the hypotheses are details on 
the sample, instrument, data collection, and data analysis. 
4.1 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses tested are detailed below. Following 
each hypothesis is text explaining its underlying rationale. 
The first two hypotheses (HI & H2) examine relationships 
between specific dimensions of technology and strategy that 
are expected to provide insights into the nature of fit. H3 
and H4 are the main focus of the model. They deal with the 
existence of significant technology differences between 
strategic groups (H3), and whether fit positively relates to 
performance (H4). 
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HI) Use of more automated, integrated process technologies 
will be positively associated with strategies which 
minimize new product introductions and/or variations in 
existing products. 
Product-process life cycle research (e.g., Abernathy, 
1975: Hayes & Wheelwright, 1979a,b) concludes that progres¬ 
sion toward automated, integrated process technologies is 
related to product standardization and high product volume. 
For the machining and tooling industry, the equivalent to 
standardization is repeat orders while the equivalent to 
high volume is the pursuit of large batch sizes. Batch size 
and repeat orders are expected to be positively correlated 
with degree of automation and degree of integration of 
process technology. 
This hypothesis extends the work of Abernathy and 
Townsend (1975) in a key way. The Abernathy tradition views 
the complexity, systemization, automation, etc., of 
processes in an absolute sense. This perspective is 
revealed, for example, in Hayes & Wheelwright’s (1979b) 
discussion of industries which have stalled in the evolution 
toward assembly line and continuous flow processes. This 
perspective emphasizes the physical characteristics of the 
process technology rather than its relation to a particular 
competitive arena. It is probably from this same perspec¬ 
tive that computer controlled processes are often hailed as 
the '’flexible," nearly as efficient, alternative. Inherent 
in HI is the idea that the concepts of automation, integra- 
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tion, systemization, and product standardization are also 
relevant within a specific competitive context, such as an 
industry. For this industry, computer controlled machine 
tools are not the flexible alternative, rather they 
represent automated efficiency. 
Support for this relationship has been found in the 
tooling and machining industry. An exploratory study 
(Schroeder et al., 1988, 1989) found the overhead costs of 
programming CNC machine tools, computerized materials 
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handling systems, CNC inspection devices, etc., makes very 
small batches prohibitive. Less directly related, a study 
of CNC usage by metalworking firms in the U.K. found that 
firms with smaller batch sizes and more unpredictable 
production had more versatile, multi-tasked operator job 
arrangements (Dodgson, 1987). The study speculates that 
more flexible work organization was needed to deal with more 
"exceptional cases" (such as more frequent programming and 
set-up changes). Unfortunately, this evidence is more 
related to procedures aspects of process technology than 
machine aspects as is our study. 
H2) Firms will use a technology if it provides special 
capabilities for a key strategy dimension, despite 
possible negative consequences with regard to less 
critical strategic dimensions. 
Firms will use given process technologies despite 
unfavorable trade-offs such as low efficiency if the tech- 
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nology provides capabilities key to their strategy or for 
serving their market segments. This is not to say that 
negative trade-offs will be overlooked, but that such firms 
will tolerate greater negative impact on a particular 
strategic dimension than firms whose strategies do not 
benefit from offsetting capabilities afforded by a particu¬ 
lar process technology. This assumes that various capabili¬ 
ties are often bundled in one process technology, and that 
there are increased costs for the more capable technology. 
In this industry, even though process automation is 
expected to correlate positively with pursuit of large batch 
sizes, process automation should also correlate positively 
with firms producing small batch sizes if they also pursue 
high precision (consistency and close tolerances). CNC 
machine tools, which represent automation for this industry, 
are said to yield higher tolerances and consistency (Jelinek 
& Goldhar, 1983; Voss, 1986), and thus should provide an 
important capability to firms targeting such market 
segments. 
H3) Process technology (levels of automation, physical 
integration, computer integration, and range of 
capabilities) will differ significantly between 
strategic groups. 
This hypothesis tests the proposition that, within an 
industry, a given process technology will be differentially 
appropriate for different strategies. The general validity 
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of this hypothesis will be inferred from theory as discussed 
earlier combined with the assumption that strategic groups 
have survived to a degree based on the viability of their 
structural whole. If process technologies are closely 
linked to strategy, as the literature suggests, variations 
in technology within an industry should coalesce around 
different strategic positions, each of which maximizes the 
advantages of its particular process technology. This 
assumes that significantly different technologies are 
available and that some kind of price/performance tradeoff 
exists between them (e.g., capital costs, or the frequently 
noted efficiency versus flexibility). Over time, firms 
which least take strategic advantage of their process 
technology either accept lower returns, fail, change strate¬ 
gies, or change process technology. A pattern of signifi¬ 
cant technology differences between groups is evidence of 
this process, and demonstrates the existence of fit as a 
"gestalt." 
H4 ) Interaction between process technology and strategic 
group membership has a significant impact on firm 
financial performance beyond that of process technology 
and strategic group membership alone. 
This hypothesis goes beyond H3 by looking more directly 
at the manifestations of lack of fit. Rather than failing, 
some firms with poor fit may continue operations indefi¬ 
nitely by accepting low returns. H4 tests for the existence 
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of fit (as moderation) which is directly linked to firm 
performance, in essence, whether the relationship between 
strategy and technology is strong enough to result in 
current performance differences between firms. This is the 
primary research question with respect to competitive 
strategy and manufacturing technology (Kotha & Orne, 1989). 
If a lack of "fit” between current strategy and accumu¬ 
lated process technology moderates the relationship between 
strategy and performance as our model suggests, a poor match 
should result in lower profitability and/or sales growth. 
Firms which have inappropriate process technology (levels of 
automation, physical integration, computer integration, and 
range of capabilities) are expected to be suffering relative 
to competitors due to excessive capital costs, poor produc¬ 
tion efficiency, lack of capabilities important to 
customers, etc. 
4.2 Sample 
The industry studied is the contract tooling & machin¬ 
ing industry. This industry was chosen for its (1) highly 
competitive nature, (2) the recent introduction of new 
process technologies, (3) relatively clear cut distinctions 
in manufacturing technologies, (4) a background understand¬ 
ing by the author from previous research, and (5) opportu¬ 
nity for field survey and research. 
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The tooling and machining industry is composed of 
approximately 11,000* small firms producing a near infinite 
variety of machined parts, machining services, tooling, 
dies, molds, jigs, fixtures, etc., for a variety of customer 
industries such as automotive, computers, and aerospace. 
Most firms are "job shops" in that they produce parts to 
customers’ specifications on a bid/contract basis. Most 
firms fall under SIC codes 3544 (special dies, tools, jigs, 
and fixtures) and 35595 (machine shop jobwork). 
These firms are predominately privately owned and small 
to medium in size. The National Tooling and Machining 
Association (NTMA), the primary trade association for the 
industry, reports the following size distribution (Table 
4.1) for the entire machining and tooling industry and 
average sales per firm for NTMA members. All figures are 
for 1979: 
Table 4.1 
Size Distribution Data for Tooling and Machining Firms 
Employees % of Ave # of Ave Sales 
per Firm Total EmDlv/Firm per Firm 
1-19 48% 10 $ 494,800 
20-49 32% 30 1,332,400 
50-99 14% 68 3,541,700 
100-249 5% 144 7,562,300 
250-499 1% 332 19,576,700 
500+ 0% - - 
*"Industry Census of the Contract Tooling and Machining 
Industry, 1979-1980," by the National Tooling and Machining 
Association, 9300 Livingston Road, Washington, DC, 20022; 
published January 1981. 
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Customers of contract machining and tooling shops are 
quite diverse. Almost any firm that uses some kind of metal 
parts are potential customers. Table 4.2 shows that the 
Automobile and Aerospace industries are by far the largest 
customer types. The large share of ’’All Other Customers” 
(13.4%) is indicative of the diversity of the markets served 
by this industry. 
Table 4.2 
Tooling and Machining Customers 
Percent Total Sales 
Customer Industries (1979) (1980 
Automotive 20.9 17.9 
Aerospace 14.6 16.8 
Fabricated Metal Products 10.1 9.6 
Electronics 9.5 10.1 
Machinery, Parts & Acces. 8.0 8.0 
Appliances 4.8 4.7 
Mining, Construction & 
Oil Field Equipment 4.7 4.9 
Ordnance 3.2 3.7 
Food Processing & Packaging 2.8 2.7 
Chemical and Petroleum 2.5 2.8 
Electrical Machinery 2.3 2.2 
Agricultural Equipment 2.3 2.2 
Pharmaceutical 0.8 1.0 
All Other Customers 13.5 13.4 
The sample population for this study is drawn from the 
3,180 member firms of the National Tooling and Machining 
Association (NTMA). The NTMA provides services such as 
lobbying, seminars and workshops, training assistance, and 
group insurance. A 1980 survey by the NTMA (footnoted 
above) of the tooling & machining industry concludes that 
59 
non-members are not significantly different from members on 
a variety of characteristics such as size, geographical 
dispersion, sales, and market segments served. 
This study did not survey firms under 15 employees 
because the construct of competitive strategy becomes more 
tenuous, and the impact of individual machine tools becomes 
too preponderate in very small firms. Such a segmentation 
reduced the relevant sample population to 1577 firms, all of 
whom were sent surveys. 
4.3 Instrument 
This study used a mail survey questionnaire to assess 
strategy, technology, and performance of NTMA member firms. 
Survey analysis offers the potential to capture more of 
current or intended strategy (Dess & Davis, 1984) than would 
data base studies typical of most strategic group research. 
4.3.1 Development 
The survey instrument was developed jointly with Dr. 
Dean M. Schroeder who, along with the author, has extensive 
background knowledge of the industry from prior research. 
Expert feedback regarding format, wording, and variables 
missed, was received from industry experts at the NTMA and 
the Massachusetts Small Business Development Center Manufac- 
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turing Assistance Program. A copy of the questionnaire is 
contained in Appendix A. 
4.3.2 Measures 
Measures were developed for the three major constructs 
of strategy, technology, and performance. Most measures 
were either ratio, or interval, such as Likert scales. 
Objective measures were used as much as possible. Where 
subjective Likert scales were used, the instructions clearly 
related the question to the total sample to preclude 
responses based on the more limited reference frame of 
direct competitors, such as those of the same strategic 
group. 
4.3.2.1 Strategy Measures 
Table 4.3 relates theoretical dimensions from the model 
(Figure 3.2 and Table 3.1) to corresponding survey measures. 
Measures are briefly described, and are referenced to 
specific questions from a copy of the questionnaire provided 
in Appendix A. The actual dimensions used in the analysis 
will be determined by principal factor analysis of the 
strategy measures. The degree to which the strategy factors 
correspond to the theoretical dimensions of Tables 3.1 and 
4.3 will demonstrate the validity of the factors. 
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Table 4.3 
Dimensions 
Strategic Grouping Measures 
[Quest #] - Survey Measures 
1. Product [1] - Categories - jigs, molds, dies, etc. 
Characteristics [2abc] - Complexity, size, precision 
[3] - Tolerance ranges sought 
[19bc] - Close tolerances and consistency 
2. Product 
Variability 
[2d,5] - New vs. repeat products 
[2f] - Similar vs. different products 
[2d,4] - Batch sizes sought 
[19h] - Importance of ability to make a wide 
variety of different products 
3. Target Markets [2h,7a] - Growing vs. declining markets 
[7b] - High vs. low tech industry 
[7c] - New vs. repeat customers 
[7d] - Government related 
[9] - Customer industry categories 
[10] - Contract vs. proprietary products 
[15] - Actively seek new customers 
4. Geographic Scope [8] - Sales locally, regionally, 
nationally, internationally 
5. Service 
Priorities 
[6] - JIT deliveries, SPC for customers 
[19d] - Verifiable quality assurance 
[19ef] - Quick turnaround from order to 
delivery; dependable delivery dates 
[19k] - Frequent contact and close customer 
relations 
6. Price Policy [14] - Lowest bidder vs. cost plus 
7. Operating 
Efficiency 
[11] - Low cost vs. differentiation 
[19a] - Importance of competitive pricing 
8. Low Overhead [17] - Low capital cost vs. state-of-art 
efficient technology 
9. Value Stage 
Participation 
[12] - Design function - strictly customer 
blue print vs. design participation 
[19ij] - Value added from engineering & design; 
extra processing (assembly) 
10. Output 
Variability 
[19g] - Importance of being able to accommo¬ 
date fluctuations in orders 
11. Distribution N/A 
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4.3.2.2 Process Technology Measures 
Research on this industry indicates that because of the 
wide variety of products made in relatively small batches, 
few dedicated, integrated, electro-mechanical-pneumatic 
controlled systems are used (see Schroeder et al., 1988, 
1989). The range of technologies used results in a 
truncated Jelinek & Goldhar (1983) scale of independent 
tools and methods (stand alone, manual machine tools) to 
programmable systems (CNC machine tool groups). This 
represents a progression of increasing automation and 
decreasing flexibility due the overhead costs of programming 
each new part. Firms in this industry typically report it 
quicker to just start manually machining a single part from 
blue print than to take the time to program all the machine 
moves. Automatic tool changers, multiple spindles, and 
automatic monitoring devices are features that further 
automate CNC machine tools. Automatic tool changers may 
increase flexibility for products within a range handled by 
the various tools. 
For this industry, physical integration comes in the 
form of machine tool groupings (work cells), robotic parts 
handling between machines, connections with other work cells 
and/or inventories via material handling systems. Computer 
integration takes the form of DNC networks (centralized, 
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electronic program loading of machines) and integrated 
CAD/CAM systems. 
Two important capability ranges are multi-axis machines 
machine tools, and the size range accommodated by machine 
tools. Multi-axis machines allow a wider range of movement 
and more complex shaping. Sizes accommodated by machine 
tools is important in determining what type of products can 
be made. 
These technology attribute measures have been grouped 
below in Table 4.4 for conceptual purposes, but one can see 
that they overlap. Materials handling systems as well as 
CAD/CAM also represent automation. Factor analysis will 
help determine overlap and arrive at factors meaningful for 
comparison with strategy. The ultimate test of how these 
variables fall within our technology construct will be 
determine by factor loadings. 
4.3.2.3 Performance Measures 
Objective measures of performance are sometimes 
difficult to obtain from owners of privately held firms 
typical of this industry. For this reason, this study asked 
for subjective measures in addition to objective measures. 
Dess & Robinson (1984) first demonstrated the viability of 
subjective measures of financial performance by finding 
that, within industries, subjective ratings of performance 
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Table 4.4 
Technology Measures 
[Quest #] - Survey Measures 
1. Automation 
[20] 
[27a] 
[27b] 
[27cde] 
[ 2 7 f ] 
[27h] 
- % sales on CNC, NC, & Conventional machine tools 
- Multi-spindle machine tools 
- Automatic tool changers 
- Automatic monitoring devices 
- CNCs set up to run unattended 
- Automatic parts changing 
2. Physical Integration 
[21] - Percent machine tools arranged by machine process, in 
work cells, line fashion, or no arrangement 
[27i] - Material handling equipment 
3. Computer Integration 
[27abc] - CAD/CAM systems 
[27d] - DNC networks 
4. Range of Capabilities 
[22] - Size ranges accommodated by machine tools 
[23c,25c,27g] - Secondary or extra capabilities on machine tools 
[25f,26] - Axis range of CNC machine tools 
by top managers correlated highly with objective measures 
such as return on assets and growth in sales. They suggest 
that researchers consider using subjective measures where 
accurate objective measures are unavailable, and the only 
alternative is to remove performance from the research 
design. This study represented such a situation. 
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4.3.2.3.1 Profitability 
Deficiencies of accounting measures of profit perform¬ 
ance are well documented (Chakravarthy, 1986; Fisher & 
McGowan, 1983; Salamon, 1985; Schwartzman, 1975; Stauffer, 
1975). This is especially true in small firms, where 
variations in owners’ compensation can cause relatively 
greater distortions of profit measures. Reliance on 
accounting measures of assets also causes problems in profit 
measures. A major machine tool can be a relatively signifi¬ 
cant asset for a small firm. Return on assets or investment 
(and return on sales to a lesser degree) can be distorted by 
differences in depreciation schedules and the size of the 
asset bases. A firm with new equipment may be well 
positioned for the future, but show lower profitability than 
a firm with old, fully depreciated equipment. This distor¬ 
tion is somewhat offset by a phenomena where new technology 
has a relatively greater positive impact on performance in 
firms with newer productive asset bases (Dertouzos et al., 
1989). If new technology generally results in higher ’’real" 
performance, the favorable performance distortions of firms 
with older, more fully depreciated asset bases will be 
somewhat offset by their relatively lower real gains from 
new technology. 
Consequently, subjective measures of profitability were 
obtained in addition to objective measures. For an objec- 
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tive measure, firms were asked to categorically indicate 
average return on sales over the past three years [Q39]. 
Subjective measures were obtained by asking firms to rate 
themselves, relative to competitors over a three year 
period, on return on investment [Q35], return on sales 
[Q36], and overall performance [Q39]. Subjective measures 
of return on sales should suffer less from asset distortions 
than return on assets. Average return over a three year 
period should also smooth distortions from asset lumpiness. 
4.3.2.3.2 Growth 
Growth should provide a good complement to profita¬ 
bility given the measurement problems discussed above. 
Growth has its own problems for this industry as many 
owner/managers may not want employee growth beyond their 
ability to manage. Sales growth should suffer less from 
this limitation than a measure of employee growth. Sales 
growth over three years was assessed subjectively, relative 
to competitors [Q37], and objectively by asking for annual 
sales volume from 1986 to 1989 [Q40], 
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4.3.2.3.3 Controls 
To control for spurious effects on performance, data 
was collected on firm size [Q34], region [Q33], and customer 
industries [Q9]. 
4.4 Data Collection 
4.4.1 Mailing and Response Rate 
A computer mailing list was provided by the NTMA. 
This was reduced to 1577 firms by eliminating firms of under 
15 employees (as noted previously). The mailing followed 
much of Dillman’s ( 1978 ) ’’total design method" for achieving 
high response rate, such as envelopes with first class 
postage and typed addresses, self-addressed, postage-paid, 
return envelopes, individually addressed cover letters, 
different type styles for questions and answers, etc. The 
NTMA logo was also included on the questionnaire cover. 
Each questionnaire included a cover letter to stimulate 
interest, and explain the NTMA’s support of the survey 
(sample cover letter in Appendix B). 
In December 1989, local NTMA chapters were instructed 
by the national NTMA to notify members to expect the 
questionnaire and request their assistance. The first 
mailing was sent in December, resulting in 468 responses. 
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The second mailing in January 1990 drew 208 responses, for a 
total of 676 responses and a 43 percent response rate. This 
is a high response rate for this industry, comparing 
favorably with a rate of twenty percent typically achieved 
by the NTMA with its annual questionnaire. 
4.4.2 Data Coding 
Data coding included judgments concerning missing data, 
apparently errant data, and combining responses to form 
composite variables. 
Non responses were, for the most part, coded as missing 
values. Only for questions 27 and 28 were non-responses 
coded as not having the technologies in question. Most 
surveys gave partial responses indicating that the questions 
had been read. It was assumed that a non-response probably 
indicated non-familiarity with the term, most likely the 
result of not having the technology. 
Questions 27 and 28 were part of a group of questions 
that were segregated as not applicable to firms without CNC 
equipment. A few firms which had 100 percent conventional 
technologies answered these questions anyhow, and indicated 
that they did have things like CAD systems and automatic 
gaging. Segregation may have distorted the results on these 
particular measures, but not too severely as few firms were 
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percent conventional. Any fires with even a little NO 
cr ONC r.s: been instructed to answer this section* 
A fairly significant amount of non-response was seen 
for the subjective measures of performance 1035-38 ] . Many 
respondents noted on the instrument that they did not know 
other firms’ performance. Apparently, this industry is too 
fragmented for firms to have a good sense of overall 
industry performance. Lower than expected correlations 
between subjective and objective measures of return on sales 
IQ39] and sales growth [Q40] (0.57 and 0.30 respectively), 
along with the comments of respondents, lead to the conclu¬ 
sion that the subjective measures should not be used. 
Fortunately, excellent response rates were obtained on the 
objective measures. 
Apparently errant results were seen on the contract and 
proprietary questions [Q10], which were expected to be 
mutually exclusive, and together, totally inclusive (sum to 
100 percent). Yet approximately twenty-nine percent of the 
responses did not sum to 100 percent. The NTMA agreed with 
our suspicion that the ’’term" contract had been misunder¬ 
stood. Telephone calls to six firms of this response type 
confirmed our interpretation. Most said that to them, 
"contract” has a more narrow usage as a one time contract 
agreement. They use "purchase order" to refer to ongoing 
contracts. The calls also indicated that the expression 
"proprietary products" was clearly understood. Accordingly, 
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contract responses were changed so that a total with the 
proprietary product question would equal one hundred 
percent. The two questions were then combined into one 
variable called "contract” with a value of 100 percent for 
purely contract firms. 
Like the contract variable, other measures were 
combined to form new variables. For the tolerances [Q3], 
batch size [Q4], and machine axis [Q26] questions, the 
category means were weighted by corresponding response 
percentages and summed to result in mean scores for each 
variable. For customer location [Q8], category weights of 
one through four were multiplied by response percentages and 
summed to form a variable reflecting increasing geographic 
dispersion of customers. Questions 20 and 21 were treated 
similarly to form variables reflecting increasing automation 
(essentially more CNC), and increasing integration (essen¬ 
tially more dedicated machine arrangements). The return on 
sales categories [Q39] were weighted on scale of 1-9 to 
reflect increasing profitability. A variable for sales 
growth (referred to above) was formed calculating the 
average annual sales growth from the sales volume figures 
[Q40]. Figures were calculated even if one end value was 
missing, resulting in a two year average for 30 cases. This 
resulted in a 93 percent response rate on the performance 
questions (Q39 and Q40) for the questionnaires returned. 
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Two measures, batch size [Q4] and firm employment 
[Q34b] were adjusted with log transformations to more 
accurately reflect their theoretical content. For example, 
the difference between 1 part and 50 parts is generally much 
more important than the difference between 500 and 600 
parts, although the later is greater in absolute terms. The 
log transformation puts less emphasis on the higher end of 
the scale, more accurately reflecting the meaningfulness of 
the differences. Evidence of this is seen in the product- 
moment correlations between the subjective [Q2e] and the 
objective [Q4] measures of batch size. One would expect the 
subjective measure to better reflect the importance of batch 
size differences. With the log transformation, the correla¬ 
tion between the subjective and objective measures increased 
from 0.56 to 0.65. Similar logic was used for the log 
transformation of firm size. 
The overall result of the coding process was a data 
base with essentially interval scale ratings (1-7), or ratio 
scale responses and indexes. 
4.4.3 Sample Refinement 
Because the survey instrument was designed to assess 
metal cutting technologies, refinement of the sample was 
needed to focus on firms with such operations. Although 
metalcutting processes are the mainstay of the industry, 
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firms of quite different nature often seek membership in the 
NTMA for a variety of reasons. This nature was judged by 
the products firms produce [Q1]. Products such as metal 
stamping, jigs, fixtures, gages, special dedicated machines, 
involve numerous technologies such as stamping presses, 
welding, handtools, etc., which are neither conventional nor 
computerized metal cutting technologies, and are too varied 
to assess. Screw machine products are metal cutting in a 
technical sense but the ultra-high volume, dedicated nature 
of these technologies set them apart from most metal cutting 
processes. 
To focus the sample, only firms for which at least 80 
percent of their output is derived from metal cutting 
processes were retained. Products judged to be derived from 
metal cutting processes are dies, molds, machined parts, and 
machining services. Written responses to the "other" 
category were distributed to the metal cutting categories 
where judged appropriate. This refinement in sample focus 
reduced the relevant sample from 676 to 399 firms. 
4.5 Data Analysis 
While figure 4.1 presents the general data analysis 
framework for the Strategy-Process Technology model which 
relates primarily to Hypothesis 4, the other three hypothe¬ 
ses draw on the preliminary steps of this framework as well. 
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Figure 4.1 
Analysis for the Strategy-Process Technology Model 
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Technology and strategy measures were factor analyzed to 
reduce measurement overlap, and reveal major underlying 
dimensions. Cluster analysis on the resulting strategy 
factors grouped firms with like strategies. This last 
section of the methods chapter discusses the factor and 
cluster analyses. Models drawing on the resulting factors 
and strategic groupings to test specific hypotheses are 
outlined in the following chapter on results. 
4.5.1 Technology Factor Analysis 
To assess a firm’s "technology,” it was necessary to 
reduce the dimensionality of the measures to some workable 
number, as well as see if they naturally grouped around 
underlying dimensions. From a theoretical standpoint, it 
seemed reasonable to expect that firms’ process technologies 
would vary on more than one underlying dimension. Such 
factors could be compared to the underlying theoretical 
dimensions proposed earlier. 
First, the relevant technology measures were identi¬ 
fied. Because this study retained a hardware focus, 
questionnaire items that dealt with usage issues were not 
included (i.e., Q24, Q27f, Q28e, Q29-Q32). These measures 
were included in this survey instrument as part of another 
study. In addition, questions 25b,d,e were not included 
because they deal with cost and depreciation rather than the 
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technologies used. Questionnaire items 27c,d,e deal with 
hardware, but were judged as not on the same level of 
relevance as the other items. The remaining sixteen 
technology items yielded a score of 0.63 for Kaiser’s 
measure of sampling adequacy (for factor analysis). This is 
considered "mediocre,” but adequate for factor analysis 
(Kaiser & Rice, 1974). 
The principal factor method was used to extract the 
factors. Six of sixteen potential factors had eigenvalues 
above one, but a scree plot did not indicate a definitive 
cut-off point. Rotations were then run on the 3,4,5, & 6 
factor solutions. Although explaining only 44.3 percent of 
the total variance, a four factor solution was chosen for 
interpretability, parsimony, and for best aligning with the 
theoretical underlying dimensions proposed earlier. Five 
and six factor solutions did not relate well to theory, and 
were not as readily interpretable. In addition, subsequent 
analysis would have been rendered very cumbersome. Factors 
of the three factor solution were not interpretable, and 
explained even less variance than the four factor solution. 
Promax oblique rotations were used. It was felt that 
interpretability would be enhanced, and that the factors 
would better reflect reality. As discussed earlier in 
chapter 3, the theoretical dimensions of technology are 
expected to be somewhat interrelated. However, one can see 
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from the inter-factor correlation matrix below (Table 4.5) 
that overlap is not consequential: 
Table 4.5 
Technology Factor Inter- Correlations 
Factorl Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 
Factor 1 1.00 -.01 .19 .12 
Factor 2 -.01 1.00 .09 . 10 
Factor 3 .19 .09 1.00 .07 
Factor 4 .12 . 10 .07 1.00 
The resulting factor loadings are displayed below in 
Table 4.6. The major contributing measures to each factor 
are grouped together along with the name ascribed. Cronbach 
Alpha coefficients were calculated within each group to 
provide reliability estimates for each factor. These 
estimates essentially hover around the .50 level which is 
considered at least adequate (Nunnally, 1967). 
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Table 4.6 
Technology Factors 
FI "Computer Aided Design” 
Stand alone CAD 
Integrated CAD/CAM 
DNC Network 
F2 "Dedicated Automation" 
Dedicated Material Handling 
Automatic Parts Changing 
Secondary Capabilities 
Product Specific Machine Layouts 
Custom Machine Tools 
Multi-Spindle Machine Tools 
F3 "Range of Capabilities" 
Machine Tools w/ Extra Capabilities 
Broad Size Range Capabilities 
Multi-Axis Machine Tools 
Average Axis of CNC Machine Tools 
F4 "Non-Dedicated Automation" 
CNC Machine Tools 
Automatic Tool Changers on CNC 
CNC-Code Programming Computer 
Percent of Total (44.3) Variance: 
Cronbach Alpha Reliability 
within factors: 
Factor Factor Factor Factor 
1 2 3 4 
.66* 
.65 
.58 
.66 
.58 
.49 
.45 -.32 
.43 .40 
.32 .40 
.71 
.55 
.45 .53 
.48 .41 
.77 
. 66 
.39 .51 
12.5 11.1 10.8 10.0 
.54 .58 .48 .48 
* Factor loadings less than .25 are not shown. 
The four factors correspond fairly well to the theoret¬ 
ical dimensions proposed earlier. Factors two and four 
parallel the integration and automation dimensions respec¬ 
tively. As expected from earlier discussion, these dimen- 
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sions show some overlap. Factor two encompasses items such 
as automatic parts changing and material handling systems 
which automate, but which also integrate by linking differ¬ 
ent tasks together. Perhaps the factor should be call 
"dedicated automation" as most of the items are either 
automating technologies, technologies or arrangements that 
are dedicated and restrict flexibility to some degree, or 
most often a combination of both. All the items generally 
result in less flexibility to produce a wide variety of 
products. 
Factor 4 generally reflects the degree to which CNC 
machine tools are used versus conventional. It logically 
includes the machine coding or programming technologies 
which are necessary for CNC. It also includes automatic 
tool changers which further automate CNC machine tools while 
maintaining flexibility. Non-dedicated automation seems to 
be the common thread. One might be tempted to call this 
factor "flexible automation" relative to factor two, but 
this term has specific meaning in production technologies, 
and also confuses the idea that stand alone, conventional 
machine tools on the other end of this factor are thought to 
be more flexible. "Non-dedicated automation" conveys the 
idea that it is more flexible than dedicated automation, but 
perhaps less flexible than non-dedicated, general purpose 
conventional machine tools. 
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Factor 3 parallels the range of capabilities dimension 
proposed earlier. Both machine tool axis measures contrib¬ 
ute as expected from earlier discussion. Broad size range 
directly indicates broad capability range. Machine tools 
with "extra capabilities" (beyond what is necessary for most 
situations) were most highly loaded. These extra capabili¬ 
ties allow a broader range of products to be made. 
Factor 1 represents computer aided design. Individual 
correlations reveal that DNC networks are probably most used 
in firms which have strong designing and programming 
functions such as integrated CAD/CAM. No association is 
found between DNC and stand alone programming technologies. 
4.5.2 Strategy Factor Analysis 
Like technology, assessment of strategy began with 
factor analysis to reduce measures to a manageable number of 
underlying factors on which to group firms. Theoretical 
factors were proposed earlier in Table 3.1. 
First, the relevant strategy measures were identified. 
Questions 6a and 6b on JIT and SPC were not included because 
some firms might not have properly understood the jargon and 
its fairly specific meaning. The broader issues behind both 
questions should be captured in the more generically worded 
questions 19d,e,f on delivery, leadtimes, and verifiable 
quality assurance. Questions 17 and 18 were not included 
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because they had the lowest communality estimates (.32 & 
.23), their inclusion hampered factor interpretation, and 
their content was more in the realm of technology assessment 
and usage than in the realm of product market strategy. 
Questions 2h and 7a, on whether firm’s customer industries 
were growing rapidly or declining, were also not included. 
Question 7a was reserved as a control variable for the 
testing of Hypothesis 4 rather than as a strategic grouping 
dimension. The remaining twenty-nine strategy items yielded 
a score of 0.70 for Kaiser’s measure of sampling adequacy. 
Kaiser & Rice (1974 ) characterize this as ’'middling," and 
thus acceptable for factor analysis. 
Again principal factor analysis was used to extract the 
factors. A scree plot of factor eigenvalues did not reveal 
a clear cut-off point. Nine factors had eigenvalues above 
one. Promax oblique rotations were run on the 7,8,& 9 
factor solutions to aid selection. The eight factor 
solution, which explained 58.3 percent of the total 
variance, was chosen for interpretability. The inter-factor 
correlation matrix is displayed below in Table 4.7 
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Table 4.7 
Strategy Factor Inter-Correlations 
FI F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 
Factor 1 1.00 .05 .02 -.04 -.08 -.07 -.13 -.12 
Factor 2 .05 1.00 .12 -.01 -.06 -.04 -.03 -.06 
Factor 3 .02 .12 1.00 .10 .14 -.14 -.05 .02 
Factor 4 -.04 -.01 .10 1.00 .13 -.23 .05 .04 
Factor 5 -.08 .06 .14 .13 1.00 .04 .09 .26 
Factor 6 -.07 .04 -.14 -.23 .04 1.00 .17 .05 
Factor 7 -.13 .03 -.05 .05 .09 .17 1.00 .04 
Factor 8 -.12 -.06 .02 .04 .26 .05 .04 1.00 
The resulting factor loadings are displayed below in 
Table 4.8. The major contributing measures to each factor 
are grouped together along with the name ascribed. Cronbach 
alpha coefficients were calculated within each group to 
provide reliability estimates for each factor. Most 
estimates are above the .50 level, which is considered at 
least adequate (Nunnally, 1967). As could be expected, the 
later factors are less reliable. 
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Table 4.8 
Strategy Factors 
Factor Factor Factor Factor 
1 2 3 4 
FI "Product Stability" 
% Sales which are repeat orders .81 
Average batch/lot size (log of) .81 
Products are large batch/lot size .77 
Products are repeat, routine .69 
Customer does design .61 
F2 "Product Precision" 
Products are high precision .84 
Customers are "high tech" .71 
Products are complex .71 
Close tolerances important .56 
Average tolerances held -.49 
F3 "Service" 
Delivery .75 
Dimensional consistency .26 .67 
Close customer relations .53 
Short lead times -.32 .51 
Verifiable quality assurance .34 .44 
Accommodate fluctuations in orders .37 
F4 "Price Premium" 
Competitive pricing -.81 
Differentiation (vs. low cost) .71 
Cost plus pricing .61 
Value added from design 
Many Customers in number 
-.36 
.31 
Percent of Total (58.3) Variance: 11.6 9.0 8.0 6.4 
Cronbach Alpha Reliability 
within factors: .83 .74 .59 .56 
Continued, next page. 
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Table 4.8 Continued 
F5 "Value Added* **1 
Value added from design 
Value added from assembly 
F6 "Customer Stability" 
Customers are repeat 
Actively seek new customers 
F7 "Geographic Scope/ 
Proprietary Product" 
Wide geographic range 
Percent products contract 
F8 "Product Range" 
Products broad in range, different 
Products large in size 
Wide variety of products important 
Many Customers in number 
Products are repeat, routine 
Customer does design 
Average tolerances held 
Accommodate fluctuations in orders 
Close customer relations important 
Factor Factor Factor Factor 
5 6 7 8 
.65 
.87 
.76 
-.71 
.76 
.33 -.55 
-.25 .71 
.68 
-.46 .46 
-.38 .42 
.27 
-.33 
.37 
-.38 
.35 -.35 
.35 
Percent of Total Variance (58.3): 6.1 5.9 5.9 5.5 
Cronbach Alpha Reliability 
within factors: .55 .45 .37 .49 
* For clarity, factor loadings less than .25 are not shown. 
** The standardized form of variables with negative factor loadings were 
reversed in polarity for the reliability calculations. Although high 
negative loadings contribute significantly and reliably to factor scores 
via regression coefficients, reliability calculations interpret the 
negative correlations as unreliable. The transformation of the follow¬ 
ing four variables overcame this problem: contract, importance of 
competitive pricing, average tolerances held, and actively seek new 
customers. 
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As can be seen below in Table 4.9, the strategy factors 
correspond quite well to the theoretical grouping dimensions 
proposed earlier in Table 3.1 
Table 4.9 
Strategy Factors and Theoretical Dimensions 
Factor Name Theoretical Dimension 
Factor 1, 
Factor 2, 
Factor 3, 
Factor 4, 
Factor 5, 
Factor 6, 
Factor 7, 
Factor 8, 
’’Product Stability.’’Product Variability” 
"Precision”. "Product Characteristics" 
"Service... "Service Priorities" 
"Price Premium". "Price Policy" 
"Operating Efficiency" 
"Value Added"."Value Stage Participation" 
"Customer Stability."Target Markets" 
"Geographic Scope/ 
Proprietary Product...."Geographic Scope" 
"Product Range."Product Variability" 
Factors 1 and 8, product stability and product range, 
raise an important distinction within the theoretical 
dimension "product variability." Product stability refers 
to long or repeat production runs which mean relatively less 
new products to be made. This results in stable production 
with a minimum of change-over. Product range on the other 
hand gets at the idea that given a particular level of 
product stability, a firm’s products might be very different 
from each other in size, complexity, fragility, configura¬ 
tion, processing requirements, etc., or very similar to each 
other. 
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Factor 7 loads most heavily on wide geographic scope, 
but also appears to have a facet that could be called 
"proprietary products." Even though firms in this sample do 
mostly contract work, they appear to have proprietary 
product lines which are sold over a wide geographic scope 
through distributors. Factor 7 also has negative loadings 
on contract, wide variety of products, customer does design, 
and fluctuations in orders, much as one would expect for 
proprietary products. However, because many firms are 
purely contract, but score high on this factor because of a 
high geographic scope, using "proprietary product" as the 
only label for this factor could be misleading. Thus a two 
part factor name was chosen. 
4.5.3 Strategy Clustering 
Clustering of the eight strategy factors was used to 
group firms with like strategies. The term "strategic 
groups" will be used to describe the clusters of like 
product-market strategies although for some it has a 
narrower meaning as noted in Chapter 3. Like other works in 
strategic management (e.g., Cool & Schendel, 1987,1988; 
Harrigan, 1985; Hambrick, 1983b,c), this study used a 
hierarchical, euclidean distance, clustering algorithm. 
Following the lead of Cool & Schendel (1987), the Ward’s 
method, which minimizes the within cluster or "error" sum of 
86 
squares, was the specific algorithm employed. Because this 
method is sensitive to outliers (Milligan, 1980), ten 
percent of data points which had the lowest estimated 
probability densities* were removed prior to clustering. 
Selection of the level or number of clusters to use was 
primarily based on interpretability. As Harrigan (1985, 
p61) notes, "the appropriate number of clusters will be a 
trade-off between parsimony and one’s need for detail." 
Cluster centroids were examined in detail for 4,5,6,7, and 8 
cluster solutions. A six cluster solution was judged to 
correspond to meaningful differences observed by the author 
in this industry. Case studies from previous research (see 
Schroeder et al., 1988, 1989) provided good reference points 
to aid in interpreting individual clusters. The four 
cluster solution had reasonable overall interpretability for 
which one could see parallels with the Porter (1980) and 
Miles & Snow (1978) typologies; however, meaningful distinc- 
* The Kth-nearest-neighbor density estimation was used 
with k=5. For further information, see Silverman (1986). 
The outliers trimmed by the clustering algorithm appear 
to be firms that have a higher than average amount of 
proprietary products (see table 4.8 for the mean values of 
the strategy factors). High geographic scope, lower 
percentage contract, slight price premium, low service, and 
low precision, are all characteristics that point to firms 
which tend to market their own products. Designing and 
marketing one’s own products has major ramifications on the 
way firms do business in ways that are different not only 
from contracting firms, but also from other proprietary 
product firms which might have totally different products, 
and marketing and distribution processes. This is reflected 
in significantly higher factor standard deviations for the 
outlier group than for each of the clusters. 
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tions found in the six cluster solution were lost. The 
seven and eight cluster solutions resulted in two very small 
clusters (17 and 13 firms) with questionable interpret- 
ability. 
Statistical indicators were also examined to see if a 
particular stopping point appeared optimal. Tests of 
optimality and statistical significance have been slow to 
develop around cluster analysis (Everitt, 1979; Hartigan, 
1975). Two key reasons for lack of progress are the lack of 
a workable null hypothesis, and that most real data sets do 
not conform to the standards of multivariate normal distri¬ 
butions (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984). 
Nonetheless, scholars in strategic management suggest 
using some kind of indicators to complement interpretability 
and parsimony as criteria in selecting the number of 
clusters. Some have suggested looking for "pronounced" 
increases in cluster tightness as measured by the mean 
squared error (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Harrigan, 1985). 
For this study, the steepest changes result from the 7 to 6 
and 6 to 5 cluster joinings. However, no real criteria 
exists by which to judge whether these changes are 
"pronounced." A scree plot revealed no significant visual 
discontinuity. / 
Cool & Schendel (1987) compare the differences between 
cluster centroids using MANOVA for clues that the clusters 
are significantly different from each other. Such analysis 
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for the 3 through 9 cluster solutions resulted in very 
significant (prob=.0001 for Hotelling-Lawley trace and 
Wilk’s Lambda) results for all the cluster solutions. 
However, the 5 and 6 cluster solutions were the only that 
resulted in significant differences across clusters for each 
of the clustering variables (eight strategy factors). 
Overall, one concludes that interpretability and relevance 
to the questions under study are most important in deciding 
on cluster level. 
To judge the character of each cluster, the mean values 
of the strategy dimensions in each cluster (Table 4.10) were 
examined. 
Table 4.10 
Mean Values of Cluster Centroids 
Cluster Number 
Strategic Factor Trim* 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Product Stability -.07 -1.21 1.05 -.13 .33 .31 -.04 
2. Precision -.76 .33 .41 .42 .30 -.15 -.79 
3. Service -.20 .19 .14 -.19 .71 -.75 .00 
4. Price Premium .26 -.16 -.65 .03 .97 -.56 .27 
5. Value Added -.14 .37 -.08 .23 -.02 -.62 .37 
6. Customer Stability -.14 .58 .44 -1.12 -.25 .18 -.41 
7. Geographic Scope/ 
Proprietary Product .91 .31 .27 -.10 -.07 -.50 -.61 
8. Product Range -.09 .43 .31 -.09 -.57 -.70 .86 
Number of firms 34 65 47 29 55 61 44 
Average Employment 63 43 71 45 53 34 42 
Percent Contract 73 100 100 87 90 99 99 
*The "trim" firms are those outliers trimmed in the clustering process 
as described in an earlier footnote. The mean values of the trimmed 
firms are displayed here to allow comparison with the final clusters. 
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By comparing the strategy factor means of one cluster 
to those of the other clusters, one can obtain a sense of 
the nature of each cluster. Keep in mind that across the 
whole sample (including the 34 outliers trimmed), the mean 
value for each factor is zero with a standard deviation of 
one. What follows are the qualitative descriptions of each 
cluster based on the results displayed in Table 4.10, and on 
the author’s knowledge of the industry based on previous 
research (see Schroeder et al., 1988 1989). A cluster name 
precedes each description. 
Cluster 1: "One-of-a-Kind" 
Cluster 1 represents primarily die and mold makers or 
firms that machine one-of-a-kind products (mean percentage 
of products which are dies and molds = 85.7). What most 
characterizes this cluster is low product stability because 
of the lowest batch sizes, and the lowest amount of jobs 
which are repeat. Customer stability is high but each mold 
or die is different, thus the higher than average score on 
product range. Firms in this cluster are among the highest 
in value added, mostly in the form of design. In the larger 
scheme of things, the firms in this cluster could be said to 
have a "one-of-a-kind" strategy. 
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Cluster 2: "Hi-Volume Parts" 
Unlike Cluster 1, Cluster 2 is distinguished by the 
highest batch sizes and repeat orders. This cluster is 
highest in government work and highest in percent products 
which are machined parts. Their customer base is fairly 
stable, precision is very high, service is slightly above 
average, value added is average, but price competition is 
intense. Firms in this group are generally larger than 
firms in the other groups. Perhaps these large, high volume 
firms are very efficient and can afford smaller margins 
across a high volume of output. 
Cluster 3: "Hi-Precision Prospector” 
This cluster is most distinguished by very low customer 
stability. Firms in this group produce less than average 
batch sizes at levels of precision higher than any of the 
other clusters. Their products are often prototype parts, 
small batches of high precision parts, or special assemblies 
(firms in this cluster score highest on value added from 
assembly). The special nature of such products leads these 
firms to search quite widely for customers requiring such 
services. 
Cluster 4: "Service Volume" 
Firms in this cluster provide significantly higher 
service than any other cluster. They provide the shortest 
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lead times, dependable deliveries (almost half on a "Just- 
in-time" basis), verifiable quality assurance ("ship-to- 
stock"), and accommodate fluctuations in orders second only 
to Cluster 6. For this high level of service and moderately 
high precision, these firms command significantly higher 
price premiums. This cluster is second highest in product 
stability, very similar to Cluster 5, but not really close 
to Cluster 2 
Cluster 5: "No Frills Volume" 
Relative to most clusters, this cluster produces 
moderately high and repeatable batches. Although lower in 
production stability, firms in this cluster are comparable 
to the "High Volume Parts" strategy (Cluster 2) in that they 
produce mostly machined parts (83 percent), many for the 
government, under conditions of intense price competition. 
Where they differ is that they provide absolutely no 
services, no value added, and they stick to a very narrow 
range of product types at lower than average precision. In 
essence, no frills. 
Cluster 6: "Opportunist" 
The salient characteristic of this cluster is the very 
wide product range. As one might expect, this is somewhat 
reflected in the highest percentage of machining services 
(11.3). This cluster is strictly contract oriented like 
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most of the clusters, but is different in that it is the 
most local in geographic scope. These firms produce the 
lowest precision and, next to Cluster 3, highest value added 
from assembly. Customer stability is low, apparently from 
doing a wide variety of jobs for a wide variety of 
customers, where ever opportunities arise. For their 
trouble, these firms command a slight price premium. 
In sum, the clusters appear to represent meaningfully 
different strategic groups. Each cluster corresponds very 
well to firms in this industry studied previously by the 
author in great detail. The relationships of the factor 
means to one another within each cluster seem to result in 
meaningful wholes. From this point, the clusters will be 
referred to as ’’strategic groups.” 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
The organization of this chapter consists of a section 
for each of the four hypotheses to be tested. Each section 
begins by restating the hypothesis for the reader’s conven¬ 
ience, followed by discussion leading to a model of the 
hypothesis and the statistical analysis used to test it, and 
ending with the results of the statistical tests. Elabora¬ 
tion of the results will be mostly limited to discussion 
about the support found for the hypotheses. Further 
interpretation, probing, and linking with other works will 
take place in the following chapter. 
5.1 Hypothesis 1 
"Use of more automated, integrated process technologies will 
be positively associated with strategies which minimize new 
product introductions and/or variations in existing 
products." 
This hypothesis examines the nature of fit by relating 
particular dimensions of strategy and technology. Factor 
analysis of strategy and technology variables provides 
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measures of the hypothesized dimensions.* New product 
introductions (wording used by the hypothesis) inversely 
corresponds to the factor "Product Stability," while 
variations in existing products corresponds to product 
range. Level of automated technologies corresponds to both 
Dedicated and Non-Dedicated Automation while integration 
corresponds mostly with Dedicated Automation. 
5.1.1 Model for HI 
Simple Pearson correlation coefficients will tell us 
about the strength, direction, and significance of relation¬ 
ships amongst these factors. 
5.1.2 Results for HI 
Results are displayed below in Table 5.1. Three of the 
four correlations are of the expected sign and significant 
at the .05 level or better, thus supporting HI. One might 
expect Dedicated Automation to be more strongly related to 
product stability than Non-Dedicated Automation, but the 
* Canonical correlation analysis was also tried using 
survey measures that correspond to the wording of H2. 
Highly significant results (.0001) were obtained for the 
first canonical correlation as well as the overall results. 
However, the new factors or "canons" did not add significant 
insight beyond analysis with the original strategy factors. 
The canonical correlation analysis is therefore not 
reported, as it would be redundant if not confusing. 
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Table 5.1 
Results of Hypothesis One 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
(Significance Probabilities in Parentheses) 
306 Observations 
Product 
Stability 
Product 
Range 
Dedicated .27716 
(.0001 ) 
-.12132 
( .0339) Automation 
Non-Dedicated 
Automation 
.35685 
(.0001) 
-.05547 
( . 3335 ) 
later, which is primarily CNC, is probably a cleaner 
relationship. Product specific machine layouts (part of 
Dedicated Automation) may not be as strong of a techno¬ 
logical imperative as CNC machine tools. 
The relationship between Product Range and Non- 
Dedicated Automation is not significant, but this is really 
to be expected. CNC is typically very general purpose and 
therefore not adversely affected by wide product range. 
Because the alternative to CNC for this sample is conven¬ 
tional machine tools which are also general purpose and thus 
not adverse to wide product range, one would not expect the 
correlation to be significant in either direction. Overall, 
HI is strongly supported. 
The results of Hypothesis One tell us something about 
the nature of fit, the specific linkages between process 
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technologies and strategic dimensions. However, more can be 
learned by looking at the other correlations between 
strategy and technology factors. Although examination of 
these correlations is not based on a priori hypotheses, 
patterns that make sense may suggest something about the 
general nature of fit between process technology and 
strategy. Table 5.2 presents these correlations. 
Examination of the correlations reveals many relation¬ 
ships that make sense. Product stability is strongly 
related to Dedicated and Non-Dedicated Automation as 
predicted by HI. In addition, Computer Aided Design (CAD) 
is negatively related to product stability as automation of 
the design process makes less sense when new products are 
few. Range of capabilities should have little to do with 
new or existing product stability if their processing 
requirements match the range of the production equipment. 
As could be expected, no relationship is found. 
Precision relates to technology pretty much as one 
might expect. CNC is positively related, and one can reason 
that parts designed by CAD would be high precision if only 
because the use of CAD indicates a technologically advanced 
firm. The same reasoning could be extended to automatic 
pallet changers, but very little else would seem to make 
Dedicated Automation related to Precision, thus the weaker 
correlation (p=.067). Range of capabilities is probably 
97 
Table 5.2 
Strategy-Technology Factor Correlations 
(Significance Probabilities in Parentheses) 
306 Observations 
Computer Non- 
Strategic Aided Dedicated Range of Dedicated 
Dimension Design Automation Capabil. Automation 
1. Product Stability -.295 * .277 * -.042 .357 * 
(.0001) (.0001) (.4640) (.0001) 
2. Precision .207 * .105 .164 * .244 * 
(.0003) (.0673) (.0040) (.0001) 
3. Service .024 .083 .066 .108 
(.6781) (.1491) (.2526) (.0588) 
4. Price Premium .023 .033 .090 -.087 
(.6902) (.5602) (.1178) (.1267) 
5. Value Added .252 * .178 * .239 * .104 
(.0001) (.0018) (.0001) (.0690) 
6. Customer Stability .107 -.146 * -.131 * .031 
(.0620) (.0104) (.0221) (.5867) 
7. Geographic Scope/ .132 * .131 * .027 -.160 * 
Proprietary Product (.0207) (.0218) (.6420) (.0049) 
8. Product Range .138 * -.121 * .309 * -.055 
(.0156) (.0339) (.0001 (.3335) 
* Probabilities below the .05 significance level are marked for the 
reader’s convenience. 
highly significant because of the complex shaping abilities 
of multi-axis machine tools. 
The relationships with Value Added make more sense when 
one looks at correlations with the design and assembly value 
added measures directly. As one might expect, CAD is 
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related *o value added fron design (p=.0001), while 
l-edicated Automation is related to value added from assembly 
p=.CCC1 ) . Range of capabilities is positively related to 
both types of value added (.0001, .0012), although a 
physical cause and effect is not apparent. CNC is strongly 
related to value added from assembly (.0003), but negatively 
related to value added from design (.0159). This last 
relationship is negative probably because mold makers, which 
no more designing than other strategic groups, do not use 
CNC for their one-of-a-kind products. 
Customer Stability is related negatively to both Range 
of Capabilities and Dedicated Automation. As one might 
expect, more customer turnover could result in a greater 
product range, and the need for equipment wTith greater 
range. Although one might expect customer stability to 
carryover into product stability, in this sample it does 
not. The "One-of-a-Kind" strategic group has the highest 
customer stability of any group but, gets many one-of-a-kind 
orders from their "regular" customers, and thus do not use 
dedicated automation. 
Given the relatively greater stability of proprietary 
products over contract products, one would expect proprie¬ 
tary products to be correlated with technology in much the 
same way as the product stability dimension. This is the 
case for Dedicated Automation, but not for CAD and Non- 
Dedicated Automation. CAD correlates positively, as one 
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might expect, simply because proprietary products entail the 
design function. Why proprietary product firms would be 
less likely to use CNC is not so obvious, but has been 
previously observed in metalworking firms (Schroeder, et 
al., 1989). The explanation given is that, although it 
might make more sense for proprietary product firms to use 
CNC, contract firms might adopt sooner because of (1) 
greater competitive rivalry, (2) the image that CNC affords 
(also Dodgson, 1987) is more important for a service 
(contract machining) than a physical product, and (3) 
because greater management attention is directed to manufac¬ 
turing equipment because it is the often the only value 
stage addressed by a contract firm as opposed to design, 
marketing, and distribution of proprietary product firms. 
Our observation is further evidence for such a possibility. 
Product Range correlates as expected. A greater Range 
of Capabilities is needed to handle products of wide range. 
If a firm designed a wide range of products, it might use 
CAD to automate the process. However, unlike CAD, Dedicated 
Automation is not flexible enough for wide product variety, 
and thus is negatively correlated as noted also in HI. 
Finally, discussion of Service and Price Premium has 
been saved for last because neither are significantly (less 
than .05) correlated with any of the technologies. Why 
might this be so? 
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Looking at correlations with individual measures of 
service and price premium provides little clue. Non- 
Dedicated Automation (CNC) is positively correlated with 
consistency (but consistency is more a quality than service 
measure), verifiable quality assurance, close customer 
relations/frequent contact, and accommodating fluctuations 
in orders. These combine to form a weak (p=,059) Non- 
Dedicated Automation-Service relationship. No other service 
measures are correlated significantly (less than .05) with 
the other technologies. For the price premium measures, no 
correlations are significant except for two relationships 
between CAD and Range of Capabilities and a measure of low 
cost versus differentiation. 
Overall, it appears that service and price premium are 
have no direct links with process technology. No direct 
impact seems plausible for the few service measures which 
are correlated with CNC. For example, defense contractors, 
which typically do verifiable quality assurance, are CNC 
users because defense parts orders are usually large. CNC 
is not needed to do verifiable quality assurance. CAD and 
Range of Capabilities probably do provide a way to differen¬ 
tiate, but the results suggest a price premium is not earned 
for this differentiation. 
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5.2 Hypothesis 2 
"Firms will use a technology if it provides special capabil¬ 
ities for a key strategy dimension, despite possible 
negative consequences with regard to less critical strategic 
dimensions." 
Hypothesis Two also predicts the nature of strategy- 
technology fit. The main issue is that more than one 
capability often comes bundled in a particular technology. 
Because these capabilities cannot be practically separated, 
a particular strategy may have strategic dimensions which 
relate both negatively and positively to the technology with 
respect to a particular firm. If the positive benefits to a 
firm’s strategy outweigh the negative tradeoffs, a firm will 
use the technology anyway. An instance of this for our 
sample is that CNC is best suited for both new product 
stability and precision. A firm might use CNC despite low 
product stability if it provided much needed high precision. 
5.2.1 Model for H2 
To get at the essence of accepting negative trade-off 
on one dimension for positive benefits on the other, two 
sub-samples were created: The 20 percent of total firms 
with the lowest scores on product stability, and the 20 
percent with the lowest scores on precision. The lowest 
"pentiles" of these dimensions were used because CNC 
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correlates positively with product stability and precision. 
One would not expect firms in the lowest pentile to use 
seemingly inappropriate CNC machine tools unless the firm 
needed some positive benefit on another dimension. 
Linear regression is use to test these two possibil¬ 
ities. Strategy factors one and two correspond directly 
with the example which supports H2. Survey Question 20 
provides a direct measure of CNC. Each sub-sample contains 
67 firms. 
(1) Low product stability sub-sample: 
CNC = f (PRODUCT STABILITY, PRECISION) 
(2) Low precision sub-sample: 
CNC = f (PRODUCT STABILITY, PRECISION) 
5.2.2 Results for H2 
The regression results for sub-samples one and two are 
displayed below in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3 
Results of Hypothesis Two 
(1) Low Product Stability Sub-sample: 
n = 6 7 
Variable 
T for HO: Probability* * 
Regression > |T J 
Coef ficient = 0 
Product Stability .124 .9015 
Precision 2.431 .0179 
R-square = .0948 
Overall F = 3.350 
Probability = .0413 
(2) Low Precision Sub-sample: 
n = 6 7 
Variable 
T for HO: Probability* 
Regression > |T| 
Coefficient = 0 
Product Stability 2.631 .0107 
Precision 1.798 .0769 
R-square = .1210 
Overall F = 4.405 
Probability = .0161 
* The significance level, Probability > J T| , is the probabil¬ 
ity of getting a larger value of T if the regression 
coefficient is truly equal to zero. A very small Probabil¬ 
ity value leads to the conclusion that the independent 
variable contributes significantly to the model. 
The results are highly significant for both possibili¬ 
ties. Among firms with very low product stability, firms 
which have high precision needs use CNC (p=.0179) despite 
the programming costs involved. Within this group, product 
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stability is so low that it does not even relate to CNC 
usage (p=.9015). Among firms with very low precision needs, 
firms with higher product stability use CNC (p=.0107) 
despite its higher capital costs. CNC somewhat relates to 
precision even within the low precision sub-sample, but the 
relationship is not significant (p=.0769). 
If one example is enough to confirm the hypothesis, H2 
is strongly support. Stronger support would come from 
similar findings for other technologies in other samples. 
5.3 Hypothesis 3 
’’Process technology (levels of automation, physical integra¬ 
tion, computer integration, and range of capabilities) will 
differ significantly between strategic groups.” 
5.3.1 Model for H3 
Hypothesis 3 essentially says that technology will be a 
function of the strategy one has, in this case the strategic 
group a firm has been classified into. Because this study 
finds four underlying process technologies, an overall 
linear model using MANOVA looks at the four technology 
factors together: 
(TECHNOLOGY FACTORS 1-4) = f (STRATEGIC GROUP MEMBERSHIP) 
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However, one can also look at each technology factor 
individually with a model using ANOVA to determine whether a 
particular technology factor varies significantly from group 
to group: 
(TECHNOLOGY FACTOR) = f (STRATEGIC GROUP MEMBERSHIP) 
5.3.2 Results for H3 
First it is insightful to 
and standard deviations within 
results are tabulated below in 
for each technology factor, the 
zero and the standard deviation 
examine 
strateg 
Table 5 
total 
equals 
the technology means 
ic groups. These 
.4. Keep in mind that 
sample mean equals 
one: 
Table 5.4 
Technology Factor Means within Strategic Groups 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
Strategic 
Computer 
Aided 
Group Design 
1. One-of-a-Kind .64 (.80) 
2. Hi-Volume Parts .08 (1.01) 
3. Hi-Precision Prosp -.08 (1.08) 
4. Service Volume .05 (1.08) 
5. No Frills Volume -.28 (.81) 
6. Opportunist -.15 (.96) 
Non- 
Dedicated Range of Dedicated 
Automation Capabil. Automation 
-.21 (1.05) .07 (.90) -.21 (.83) 
.29 (1.14) .05 (1.13) .37 (.93) 
-.01 (1.01) .30 (.81) .02 (.92) 
.12 (.85) -.23 (.95) .15 (1.06) 
-.03 (.85) -.33 (.91) .23 (.97) 
-.20 (.85) .38 (.98) -.16 (.96) 
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Within these scores, one finds patterns that make sense 
for each strategy. The "One-of-a-Kind" strategy has 
significantly higher than average CAD capabilities given the 
preponderance of mold makers which do design work. Both 
kinds of automation are lower than average because of 
extremely low batch sizes. On the other hand, a "Hi-Volume 
Parts" strategy has the highest levels of both kinds of 
automation because of its very large and repeat batches. 
The "Hi-Precision Prospector" strategy has an above average 
range of capabilities to deal with the many customer needs 
that it seeks to fulfill. The "Service" strategy has a 
narrower range of capabilities to match its narrow product 
range. The "No Frills Volume" strategy has high non- 
dedicated automation like the "Hi-Volume Parts" strategy, 
but has only average dedicated automation as its batches are 
not quite as high or repeatable. These firms also score 
negative on CAD and Range of Capabilities as they have no 
intention of performing value added or accommodating a wide 
range of products. The "Opportunists" have the widest range 
of capabilities of any strategy. This provides them the 
means to take on a variety of jobs as opportunities arise. 
These firms score negative in all the other technologies as 
they do not design, have very low precision needs, and have 
no need of automation given the unpredictability of their 
product mix. * 
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The patterns described above make sense but the 
question remains as to whether the technology means are 
significantly different from each other. Does variance 
within strategic groups overshadow the apparent variance 
between groups? For the answer to this question, we turn to 
the results of the MANOVA and ANOVA for the models described 
above. 
The overall MANOVA model results in highly significant 
positive results at the .0001 level (Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5 
Results of Hypothesis Three; MANOVA 
Num Den 
Statistic Value F DF DF 
Wilks’ Lambda .754 4.00 20 900 
Hotelling-Lawley Trace .302 4.07 20 1078 
Pr > F 
.0001 
.0001 
The ANOVA results are displayed below in Table 5.6. 
Three of four technology factors taken individually were 
also highly significantly different across strategic groups. 
The other, "Dedicated Automation" is only significant to a 
.0975 level. 
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Table 5.6 
Results of Hypothesis Three: ANOVA 
Tech Factor 
Num Den 
DF DF F Value Pr > F 
Computer Aided Design 
Dedicated Automation 
Range of Capabilities 
5 
5 
5 
5 
274 
274 
274 
274 
6.45 
1.88 
3.97 
2.85 
.0001 
.0975 
.0017 
.0158 Non-Dedicated Automation 
Overall, one concludes that H3 is strongly supported. 
It appears that process technology does vary significantly 
between strategic groups. 
5.4 Hypothesis 4 
’’Interaction between process technology and strategic group 
membership has a significant impact on firm financial 
performance beyond that of process technology and strategic 
group membership alone.” 
Like H3, there are a few different ways to interpret 
this hypothesis. One way, as outlined below in Model 1, is 
to look within each strategic group for significant rela¬ 
tionships between a technology factor and each of the two 
kinds of performance, return on sales (ROS) and average 
annual growth (GROW). The "vitality” of customer markets as 
indicated by their industry growth may also have a direct 
bearing on the performance of firms serving those markets. 
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Accordingly, market growth (MARKET) as measured by survey 
question 7a is included in most models*. 
5.4.1 Model I for H4 
ROS = f (MARKET, TECHNOLOGY FACTOR) 
GROW = f (MARKET, TECHNOLOGY FACTOR) * 
* Within each strategic group, for each technology factor. 
Model I was tested using least-squares linear regres¬ 
sion. To make sure a linear model was appropriate, scatter- 
plots of each technology-performance relationship within 
each strategic group were examined for evidence of curvilin¬ 
ear relationships. No clear patterns other than linear were 
found. 
Another way to consider within strategic groups 
relationships is to view process technology as a whole and 
test the model with all technology factors together. 
*Firm size might also have an impact on profitability 
and growth. Firm size (total employment and log of total 
employment) was tried in the model initially, but did not 
show any evidence of a relationship with either growth or 
return on sales. It was not included in the final models 
reported. 
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5.4.2. Model II for H4 
ROS = f (TECHNOLOGY FACTORS 1-4) 
GROW = f (TECHNOLOGY FACTORS 1-4) * 
* Within each strategic group. 
Liner regression was also used to test this model. 
Unlike Model I, MARKET was not included so that the overall 
regression result would represent the significance of the 
combined effect of the four technology factors. 
The first two models look only at performance differ¬ 
ences within strategic groups. However, before one can 
really conclude that strategic group membership makes a 
difference in technology-performance relationships, one 
needs to look at these relationships across strategic 
groups. This is necessary to determine whether relation¬ 
ships within individual groups are different enough from 
other within groups relationships. If the relationship 
between technology and performance was roughly the same for 
every strategic group, one could say that technology made a 
difference in performance but would have to conclude that 
fit with strategy did not make a difference. 
Across group examination in this case is what 
Venkatramen (1989) labels the "moderation" form of fit, 
which he asserts is most typical in strategy research. In 
this model of fit, if the interaction coefficient of tech- 
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nology and strategic group membership is significant, while 
accounting for the main effects of strategic group member¬ 
ship and technology by themselves, one can conclude that fit 
exists relative to the particular criterion variable used 
(in this case, two types of performance). Like Model I, 
technology factors can be examined individually: 
5.4.3 Model III for H4 
ROS = f (MARKET, STRATEGIC GROUP MEMBERSHIP, TECHNOLOGY 
FACTOR, STRATEGIC GROUP MEMBERSHIP*TECHNOLOGY 
FACTOR) * 
GROW = f (MARKET, STRATEGIC GROUP MEMBERSHIP, TECHNOLOGY 
FACTOR, STRATEGIC GROUP MEMBERSHIP*TECHNOLOGY 
FACTOR) * 
* For each technology factor. 
This linear model is typically tested with "moderated 
regression analysis" (Venkatramen, 1989), which signifies 
the inclusion of an interaction term. In this study, 
generalized linear regression (including the appropriate 
interaction terms) is used because strategy is a categorical 
variable. 
The technology-strategy interaction model can also 
examine all technology variables together as did Model II. 
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5.4.4 Model IV for H4 
ROS = f (MARKET, STRATEGIC GROUP MEMBERSHIP, TECHNOLOGY 
FACTORS 1-4, STRATEGIC GROUP MEMBERSHIP*TECH¬ 
NOLOGY FACTORS 1-4) * 
GROW = f (MARKET, STRATEGIC GROUP MEMBERSHIP, TECHNOLOGY 
FACTORS 1-4, STRATEGIC GROUP MEMBERSHIP*TECH¬ 
NOLOGY FACTORS 1-4) * 
5.4.5 Results of Model I for H4 
The regression results for the test of Model I are 
shown below in Table 5.7. For clarity, only the probability 
values are shown for T tests of each variable’s regression 
coefficient. Only those below a .05 significance level are 
shown. For all of the probabilities shown, the correspond¬ 
ing regression coefficients are all positive. Of the 
technology relationships shown as significant, in all cases 
(except technology factor 4 (TF4)-GROW in Group 1) the 
overall regression equations are significant to at least the 
.05 level. 
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Table 5.7 
Results of Hypothesis Four: Model I 
Individual Technologies within Strategic Groups 
(Probabilities for T test of each variable’s regression coefficient) 
Strategic Group # 
n = 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
(65) (47) (29) (55) (61) (44) 
i tjcii r au i. 
1 1 1 1 1 
ROS = MARKET 
1 1 1 1 1 
! ! : ! .0344 j 
TECH FAC ! ! .0126 J ! ! 
i i i i i 
GROW = MARKET ! j i i .0008 i 
TECH FAC ! ! .0159 ! ! ! 
i i i i i 
i i i i i 
i i i i i iecn rac l i i i i i 
i i t i i 
ROS = MARKET 
i i i i i 
! ! ! ! .0239 j 
TECH FAC ! ! ! .0004 ! | 
i i t i i 
GROW = MARKET ! ! ! ! .0003 ! 
TECH FAC i i i t i i i i t i 
i i i i i i i i i i 
i i i _ _ i i _ iecn rac o i i i i i 
i i i i i 
ROS = MARKET 
i i i i i 
! ! ! ! .0328 ! 
TECH FAC .0029 ! j ! ! ! 
i i i i i 
GROW = MARKET ill! .0014 ! 
TECH FAC i i i i i i i i i i 
i i i i i i i i i i 
i i i i i iecn rac 4 i i i i i 
i i i i i 
ROS = MARKET 
t ii  
! ! ! : .0294 j 
TECH FAC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
GROW = MARKET i i ! i .0017 I 
TECH FAC j .0468 | J ! .0035 ! 
i i i i i i i i i i 
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There appears to be little support for H4 in these 
results. Although highly significant, evidence for a 
relationship between technology and performance is found in 
only six of forty-eight regressions. Growth of customer 
markets does not explain performance much better, with 
significance below the .05 level in only eight of forty- 
eight regressions. 
5.4.6 Results of Model II for H4 
The results of Model II are displayed below in Table 
5.8 similarly to those of Model I. Probabilities of T tests 
for all the regression coefficients are displayed along with 
their sign. Overall regression R-squares and probabilities 
are also shown. Probabilities below the .05 significance 
level are underlined for the reader’s convenience. 
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Table 5.8 
Results of Hypothesis Four: Model II 
Overall Technology with Strategic Groups 
(Probabilities for T test of each variable’s regression coefficient) 
Strategic Group # 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
# Firms in group: (65) (47) (29) (55) (61) (44) 
ROS = TECH FAC 1 
1 
(-). 7207*1 
1 
.8670! .0158 
1 
!(-).4923 ! .9849 (-).6098 
TECH FAC 2 .2460J .0991! .5298 ! .0002 !(-).7514 .2044 
TECH FAC 3 .0068! .9396! .4289 !(-).2501 ! (-) .9106 (-).5573 
TECH FAC 4 .8833! 
i 
.3194! 
i 
.5834 ! .9460 
i 
! (-).5349 .7081 
R-Square .1866 J .0997 J .2941 ! .2895 ! .0112 .0610 
Overall P .0250 ! 
i 
.3796 ! 
i 
.1211 ! .0054 
i 
! .9622 .6871 
GROW= TECH FAC 1 
i 
i 
(-).9327| | 
i 
i 
-). 3094 j' .0366 
i 
i 
!(-).6046 ! .1508 .2704 
TECH FAC 2 (-).3244 J .3781! (-).7387 ! .1377 !(-).6883 (-).4786 
TECH FAC 3 .7928! .9653! (-).9215 !(-).9364 !(-).1282 .7530 
TECH FAC 4 (-).6567! 
i 
.0428! 
i 
(-).5741 ! .2168 
1 
! .0057 .9086 
R-Square .0276 ! .1360 ! .2322 ! .0815 ! .2580 .0553 
Overall P .8296 ! .2112 ! .2366 ! .4677 ! .0056 .7269 
The perspective of Model II is more encouraging, but 
the results are similar to those of Model I. The signifi¬ 
cance of individual regression coefficients match the 
results of Model I in every case. This is to be expected 
given the relative independence of the technology factors. 
Where the individual technology-performance relationships 
within in a group are very strong (i.e., TF3-R0S in Groupl; 
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TF2-ROS in Group4; TF4-GR0V in Group5), they render the 
overall regression significant. 
If one underlying technology dimension can be 
considered adequate to distinguish the 'process technology" 
of one firm from another, Model II yields more encouraging 
results, with significance in three of twelve cases. 
Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect each of the four 
technologies to be equally important to every strategic 
group, just as it is unrealistic to expect every strategic 
group to be different from other strategic groups on every 
strategic dimension. Additionally, if one believes "firm 
performance" to be sufficiently characterized by only one 
kind of performance (either ROS or Growth), then signifi¬ 
cance is found in three of six cases. This perspective 
seems to offer partial support for H4. 
5.4.7 F.esuits of Model III for H4 
The results of testing Model III are displayed in Table 
5.9. Generalized linear regression (including appropriate 
interaction terms) is used because strategy is a categorical 
variable. Accordingly, the significance of individual 
variables is assessed with an F test for Type III sum of 
squares (incremental sum of squares as if each variable was 
added to the model last). Probabilities below a .05 signif¬ 
icance level are marked with an asterisk for convenience. 
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Table 5.9 
Results of Hypothesis Four: Model III 
Individual Technologies Across Strategic Groups 
Tech Fac 1 (CAD) F-Value Prob > F 
ROS MARKET 5.17 .0238 * Overall F 1.83 
STRATEGY 1.35 .2434 Prob > F = .0438 
TECH FAC 1 0.74 .3902 
STRATEGY * TECH FAC 1 1.62 .1560 R-Square = .0787 
GROW • MARKET 8.00 .0051 * Overall F 2.11 
STRATEGY 0.43 .8298 Prob > F = .0171 
TECH FAC 1 3.95 .0480 * 
STRATEGY * TECH FAC 1 1.31 .2608 R-Square .0918 
Tech Fac 2 (Dedicated Automat) F-Value Prob 
ROS = MARKET 5.26 .0226 * Overall F - 2.92 
STRATEGY 1.30 .2626 Prob > F = .0008 
TECH FAC 2 7.77 .0057 * 
STRATEGY * TECH FAC 2 2.31 .0449 * R-Square .1198 
GROW - MARKET 9.53 .0023 * Overall F = 1.86 
STRATEGY 0.51 .7698 Prob > F — .0394 
TECH FAC 2 0.65 .4219 
STRATEGY * TECH FAC 2 1.28 .2743 R-Square — .0820 
Tech Fac 3 (Range of Capabl) F-Value Prob 
ROS = MARKET 4.76 .0300 * Overall F 2.17 
STRATEGY 1.70 .1352 Prob > F — .0134 
TECH FAC 3 2.86 .0920 
STRATEGY * TECH FAC 3 1.94 .0874 R-Square .0921 
GROW = MARKET 7.75 .0058 * Overall F 1.51 
STRATEGY 0.99 .4248 Prob > F - .1207 
TECH FAC 3 0.00 .9789 
STRATEGY * TECH FAC 3 0.51 .7662 R-Square — .0676 
Continued, next page. 
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♦able 5.9 Continued 
Tech fac A SonHDedic. Autoaat) F-Value Prob 
ROS = MARKET 5.23 .0231 * Overall F 1.48 
STRATEGY 1.57 .1690 Prob > F . 1335 
TECH FAC 4 0.70 .4035 
STRATEGY * TECH FAC 4 0.79 .5543 R-Square .0644 
GR0*» = MARKET 6.56 .0110 * Overall F 2.51 
STRATEGY 1.00 .4181 Prob > F — .0039 
TECH FAC 4 3.47 .0635 
STRATEGY * TECH FAC 4 1.79 .1157 R-Square = .1075 
•Probabilities belov a .05 significance level are marked with asterisks. 
The results of Model I are again evident in the results 
of Model III. In this case, the strong individual factor, 
within groups relationships (i.e., TF3-ROS in Groupl; TF2- 
ROS in Group4; TF4-GROW in Group5) are spread out over all 
the strategic groups. All three relationships appear to be 
strong enough to render significant (to the .10 level) main 
effect relationships between technology and performance 
(.0057, .0920, .0635). Unfortunately, this strength is 
dissipated over more degrees of freedom for strategy- 
technology interaction. Only Tech Fac 2 (Dedicated Automa¬ 
tion) shows evidence (prob = .0449) of an interaction effect 
below the .05 level. Tech Fac 3 (Range of Capabilities) 
shows interaction at a probability of .0874. 
Vitality of customer industries (MARKET) is strongly 
related to performance in all cases. The strength of this 
relationship is apparently strong enough to render most of 
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the overall regressions significant. No significance is 
found for the main effect of strategic group membership. 
5.4.8 Results of Model IV for H4 
Model IV looks at the technology factors taken together 
across strategic groups. The results are displayed in Table 
5.10. Probabilities below the .05 significance level are 
marked with an asterisk. 
Table 5.10 
Results of Hypothesis Four: Model IV 
Overall Technology, Across Strategic Groups 
F-Value Prob > F 
ROS = MARKET 5.56 .0192 * 
STRATEGY 1.18 .3176 
TECH FAC 1 0.94 .3341 
TECH FAC 2 9.07 .0029 * Overall F = 1.95 
TECH FAC 3 0.96 .3292 Prob > F = .0033 
TECH FAC 4 0.50 .4800 
STRATEGY * TECH FAC 1 1.61 .1590 
STRATEGY * TECH FAC 2 2.29 .0467 * R-Square = .1966 
STRATEGY * TECH FAC 3 1.72 .1316 
STRATEGY * TECH FAC 4 0.41 .8393 
GROW = MARKET 6.06 .0146 * 
STRATEGY 0.61 .6917 
TECH FAC 1 1.93 .1666 
TECH FAC 2 0.33 .5673 Overall F = 1.53 
TECH FAC 3 0.01 .9078 Prob > F = .0434 
TECH FAC 4 2.32 .1288 
STRATEGY * TECH FAC 1 1.44 .2102 
STRATEGY * TECH FAC 2 1.03 .4010 R-Square = .1655 
STRATEGY * TECH FAC 3 0.30 .9149 
STRATEGY * TECH FAC 4 1.54 .1795 
* Probabilities below a .05 significance level are marked with asterisks. 
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In these results, one sees the last vestiges of the 
individual factors, within groups relationships. However, 
only Dedicated Automation’s positive impact on ROS remains 
significant as a main effect (p=.0029), and contributes 
significantly to an interaction effect with strategy 
(p=.0467). Only a trace of the Range of Capabilities-ROS 
relationship (p=.1316), and the Non-Dedicated Automation- 
GROW relationship (p=.1795), are found as interaction 
effects. 
The overall models are significant (p=.0033, p=.0434), 
apparently aided by the strong contribution of market 
vitality. The performance variance explained by these 
models (20 and 17 percent) is not trivial given the myriad 
of things that impact performance. The main and interaction 
effects of Dedicated Automation explain approximately three 
and four percent of the total ROS variance respectively (not 
displayed in table). 
5.4.9 Overall Results for H4 
Given the results of the four models, H4 does not 
appear to be sufficiently supported. Only about 13 percent 
(6 of 48) of the individual factors, within groups relation¬ 
ships are significant (Model I). A quarter of (3 of 12) the 
relationships are significant if one considers the technol¬ 
ogy factors taken together (Model II). Half (3 of 6) are 
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significant for one or the other types of performance. 
These relationships basically hold, but are diluted within 
the interaction models (III & IV), so that in the overall 
model (IV), only a Dedicated Automation-Strategy interaction 
relationship with ROS remains significant. 
Even though the cross-strategy interaction models (III 
& IV) are considered by the literature to be the appropriate 
tests for "fit as moderation" (Venkatramen, 1989) between 
two variables (strategy and technology), Model I appears to 
be the most instructive. If one had a mixture of signifi¬ 
cant within groups relationships of varying strength and 
sign, then a cross-strategy model would indicate whether 
these relationships are different enough from each other to 
conclude that strategy really makes a difference. But 
significant results from such a model by itself could be 
misleading if within groups relationships were not examined. 
In our case, for a particular technology factor, only one 
within groups relationship with performance is ever signifi¬ 
cant. In the case of Dedicated Automation within Strategic 
Group 4 ("Service Volume"), the positive relationship with 
ROS is strong and different enough from the other five non¬ 
significant within groups relationships to render a cross¬ 
groups test significant (as in Model III). This is not 
necessarily the conceptually "ideal" between-groups contrast 
that one hopes to find in support H4. 
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Whatever the model, the important elements of structure 
that appear throughout the four models are three very 
strong, positive within groups relationships: 
1. Dedicated Automation-ROS within the "Service Volume" group 
2. Range of Capabilities-ROS within the "One-of-a-Kind" group 
3. Non-Dedicated Automation-GROW within the "No Frills Volume" group 
Three less strong, but significant, within groups relation¬ 
ships also merit discussion: 
4. CAD-ROS within the "Hi-Precision Prospector" group 
5. CAD-GROW within the "Hi-Precision Prospector" group 
6. Non-Dedicated Automation-GROW within the "Hi-Volume Parts" group 
Further examination and discussion of these relationships 
will be presented in the next chapter. 
5.5 Summary of Results 
Three of four hypotheses received strong support. With 
strong, interpretable technology differences between 
strategic groups (H3), this study’s main question of a 
relationship between technology and strategy appears to be 
supported. Fit anchored to performance (H4), was not 
supported. Discussion of these results, and further probing 
into the nature of the within-groups performance relation¬ 
ships uncovered in H4 follow in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
This chapter is organized around six topics. The first 
three address the results of the hypotheses testing. HI and 
H2 are discussed for what they tell us about the "Nature of 
Fit." H3 is speaks to the "Existence of Fit," while the 
results of H4 are probed for the existence of "Fit Anchored 
to Performance." After discussion of the results, the 
question of "Generalizability of the Findings" is addressed. 
The chapter finishes with this study’s "Contribution to 
Current Research," and "Implications and Suggestions for 
Future Research." 
6.1 The Nature of Fit 
As determined in Chapter 2, details on the nature of 
fit between process technologies and competitive priorities 
are so far conspicuously missing from the manufacturing 
strategy literature. This section tries to shed some light 
on these alleged but undisclosed linkages by discussing the 
results of HI, H2, and the pattern of relationships found 
between the other strategy and technology dimensions. 
HI showed that dedicated and non-dedicated automation 
are most appropriate under conditions of new and existing 
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product stability. These results are consistent with 
thinking about conventional automation and integration 
(e.g., Abernathy & Townsend, 1975; Hayes & Wheelwright, 
1979a,b), but not for the case of Non-Dedicated Automation. 
These "programable technologies” (comprised mostly of CNC 
machine tools) are reported to have the flexibility to 
switch product runs with little loss of efficiency (Adler, 
1988; Wheelwright, 1984; Jelinek & Goldhar, 1983; Thompson & 
Paris, 1982; Voss, 1986). This study’s finding is congruent 
with previous research in this industry in which CNC was 
found to be inappropriate for small batch sizes and non- 
repeat products (Schroeder et al., 1988, 1989). 
The explanation of this finding lies with the differ¬ 
ence between new and existing product stability as discussed 
in Chapter 3. The literature generally does not make this 
distinction explicit, but is implicitly referring to 
existing product stability. While product switches may be 
inconsequential to CNC technologies, programming new 
products is not. 
Ideally, the two types of product stability should be 
treated separately. In theory, each would probably relate 
differently to CNC. In our sample, new product stability 
(repeat orders) and existing product stability (batch size) 
were strongly correlated and formed one strategy factor. In 
a mostly contracting industry, a small order size often 
equals batch size (a firm runs the whole order in one 
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batch). For a given capacity or firm size, small batches 
therefore reflect many new products. On the other end, it 
is the larger volume parts makers who also get repeat 
orders. In other sample industries, batch sizes may have 
less or little to do with how often a product is redesigned. 
HI also found that Dedicated Automation was inappropri¬ 
ate in conditions of high Product Range, while Non-Dedicated 
Automation was unrelated to Product Range. While the 
literature is typically not explicit about the idea of wide 
product range, the finding on Dedicated Automation makes 
sense, and is congruent with past research (e.g. Abernathy & 
Townsend, 1975). Although the literature (Adler, 1988; 
Wheelwright, 1984; Jelinek & Goldhar, 1983; Thompson & 
Paris, 1982; Voss, 1986) implies that CNC is typically very 
general purpose, and therefore not adversely affected by 
wide product range, Blois (1985) notes that flexible 
manufacturing systems (perhaps semi-dedicated automation) 
are very inflexible outside of their designed product range. 
Likewise, CNC surely has some limits such as size or 
complexity. However, because the alternative to CNC for 
this sample is conventional machine tools which are also 
general purpose, and probably subject to similar limits, one 
would not expect the correlation to be significant in either 
direction. 
Hypothesis Two tells us that we cannot expect one-to- 
one correspondence between strategic needs and particular 
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process technologies. Although strategic dimensions may be 
conceptually independent from each other, in practice, 
supporting capabilities often come bundled in one technology 
offering. In this study, among firms with very low product 
stability, firms with higher precision needs used more CNC 
despite the programming costs involved. Likewise, among 
very low precision firms, firms with higher product stabil¬ 
ity used more CNC despite higher equipment cost. The more 
complex correspondence found in this hypothesis makes 
relationships between process technology less clean and any 
technology imperative less obvious. 
Examination of the correlation matrix between technol¬ 
ogy and strategy factors (Table 5.2) also tells us something 
about the nature of strategy-technology fit. Although this 
examination is post hoc, many of the relationships make 
sense as discussed earlier, and provide ideas for further 
testing. In addition, the overall character of the correla¬ 
tions is meaningful for what it tells us about the nature of 
f it. 
What can be concluded from the strategic dimensions 
which appear to be related to process technology? Most 
represent physical product characteristics such as quality 
(precision and consistency), the stability of new and 
existing products, differentness or range of products made, 
or extra processing of the products (value stages). These 
product attributes are primarily consequences of particular 
127 
market segments. In essence, this study finds a link 
between what products to make for what markets (product- 
market strategy), and how to make those products (process 
technology). 
6.2 The Existence of Fit 
Hypothesis Three demonstrates that strategy-technology 
linkages do add up to the existence of fit as a gestalt. 
The significant differences in technology between the 
strategic groups suggest that over a period of time, 
variations in technology have coalesced around different 
strategic positions as firms with inappropriate technology 
have either vanished or changed strategic positions. The 
logic and interpretability of the technology differences as 
discussed earlier are key in demonstrating the existence of 
fit. Although conceptually simple, this kind of statistical 
demonstration of significant difference in technology 
between strategies in an industry has not been done before. 
6.3 Fit Anchored to Performance 
Hypothesis Four attempts to assess the existence of fit 
anchored to firm performance. In this somewhat stronger 
(than H3) conceptualization, the relationship between 
strategy and technology should be manifest by its impact on 
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firm performance. The results of testing H4 show little 
support for the idea that fit between process technology and 
strategy will be reflected in higher performance. 
One response to these results is that a clear, strong 
relationship was a lot to expect. The results of H2 show 
that relationships between strategy and technology dimen¬ 
sions are often not a clean, one-to-one correspondence. 
Discussion in Chapter 3 pointed out that, not only is 
performance hard to measure, but so many factors converge to 
impact performance that our relationship might be difficult 
to perceive through the noise. However, even despite the 
difficulties of performance measurement, one might expect at 
least one or the other performance measures (ROS or Growth) 
to be meaningfully measured because the drawbacks for each 
counteract the other to some degree (e.g., a firm reporting 
low profit due to high investment would likely report high 
growth). In addition, despite the noise surrounding a 
multi-faceted construct like performance, one might expect 
that our hypothesized relationship would show through given 
our relatively large sample size. 
Another response is that there might be more here than 
meets the eye. After all, one would not expect every 
strategic group to have significantly different technology- 
performance relationships with respect to each of the other 
groups for each of the technologies. Similarly, strategic 
groups are not different from every other group on every 
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dimension. While the results of this study are still not 
strong enough to support H4 , it might be instructive with 
respect to theory building to examine the traces of technol¬ 
ogy-performance relationships found in Model I. 
6.4 Exploration of Individual Technology-Performance 
Relationships 
If such a thing as technology-strategy-performance fit 
exists, one might expect every strategic group to have at 
least one technology imperative. When one considers the 
within group relationships identified previously, this study 
does find a technology imperative for all but the 
"Opportunists" strategic group (see Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1 
Significant Within Groups Technology- 
Performance Relationships 
1. Range of Capabilities-ROS within "One-of-a-Kind" (.0068)* 
2. Dedicated Automation-ROS within "Service Volume" (.0002) 
3. Non-Dedicated Automation-GROW within "No Frills Volume" (.0057) 
4. Non-Dedicated Automation-GROW within "Hi-Volume Parts" (.0428) 
5. CAD-ROS within "Hi-Precision Prospector" (.0158) 
6. CAD-GROW within "Hi-Precision Prospector" (.0366) 
* Probabilities are from Model II, Table 5.8, for the individual 
technology while taking into account the other three technologies. 
The next question is whether these technology-perform¬ 
ance relationships make sense within their context and what 
does this tell us about the performance impact of fit? 
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To search for the answer, each relationship is examined 
for underlying strategic dimensions that are most important 
in the technology-performance relationship within the 
corresponding strategic group. In these discussions, 
correlations referred to are between strategy and technology 
factors unless otherwise noted (e.g., a correlation 
involving a survey measure). The term "interaction’' is used 
to refer to the significance of strategy-technology interac¬ 
tion terms in liner regression models. Such interactions 
are taken from within a strategic group to try and isolate 
which strategic dimensions underlie the technology- 
performance relationship within that group. For example, if 
Technology Factor One (TF1) was related to ROS within a 
group, an interaction term of TF1 and the each of the eight 
strategy factors would be examined in relation to ROS within 
that strategic group (R0S=TF1*SF1, R0S=TF1*SF2, R0S=TF1*SF3, 
.... SF8). This essentially tells us whether, within a 
group, firms which score high on TF1 and on SF1 (or other 
factors) also score higher on ROS. 
Range of Capabilities appears to relate logically to 
ROS within the "One-of-a-Kind" strategic group. One might 
expect that a wide capability range would allow firms to 
command higher margins by being able to do a wider range of 
products or more complex products (with multi-axis capabili¬ 
ties). Significant interaction between Range of Capabili¬ 
ties and Product Range (.0106), and between Range of 
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Capabilities and Precision (.0040), with ROS, support this 
expectation. Interestingly, interaction with Product 
Stability was also significant (.0029) but negative. 
Examination of individual technology measures revealed that 
the underlying influence came from Product Specific Layouts 
(Survey Question #21), which interacted positively (.0073) 
with Product Stability as one might suspect. This measure 
loads negatively in the Range of Capabilities Factor (see 
Table 4.6), thus causing the negative interaction relation¬ 
ship. In sum, all the linkages make sense, although this 
last linkage hints of larger than expected product stability 
for some firms than one would expect to find in this group, 
stable enough to warrant product specific machine layouts. 
Because "Service" is the salient characteristic of the 
"Service Volume'1 strategic group, one might expect higher 
ROS to be related to service, and whatever technology 
supported that extra service. However, while related to 
ROS, dedicated automation is not related to service, nor is 
it apparent how it would be related. The linkages that are 
significant in this group are interactions between Dedicated 
Automation, and the strategy factors Product Stability, 
Precision, and Price Premium. Dedicated Automation makes 
sense for Product Stability, and Price Premium is probably 
significant as proxy for ROS. It is not clear why Dedicated 
Automation would be needed for precision, but perhaps things 
like automatic parts changers reflect technologically 
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sophisticated firms which tend to deal in high precision 
products, especially defense aerospace. 
The two positive relationships (within "No-Frills 
Volume” and "Hi-Volume Parts" groups) between Non-Dedicated 
Automation (CNC) and Growth appear very similar. In both 
groups, CNC interacts negatively with Price Premium and 
Product Range in relation to Growth. For Price Premium, it 
may be that firms are growing faster because they are 
pricing aggressively. In this case, CNC may have nothing to 
do with growth, but may indicate that it is the higher 
volume firms which need aggressive pricing. Firms with wide 
product ranges show some signs of slower growth, but those 
with CNC even slower growth. The CNC equipment may be 
limiting growth by not being able to accommodate a wide 
product range (such as size). Perhaps these firms have not 
yet adjusted their customer base to grow with CNC. 
In the case of the "No-Frills Volume" group, CNC 
interacts negatively with Value Added (primarily from 
design) with respect to Growth. In this case, a firm 
probably finds it easier to grow without having to expand a 
design function. It would purchase CNC equipment rather 
than conventional machine tools because of higher volume. 
This is perhaps a pure example of "No Frills" which charac¬ 
terizes this group. 
Within the "Hi-Volume Parts" group, Customer Stability 
interacts positively with CNC in relation to growth. 
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Customer Stability is high in this group compared to other 
groups, but is not significantly related to growth. Only in 
interaction with CNC does Customer Stability result in 
growth. The reason behind this relationship is not clear, 
but perhaps the firms which are growing the fastest have 
some stable relationships with growing customers, and are 
buying CNC machine tools rather than conventional. 
In the last two relationships to be discussed, within 
the "Hi-Precision Prospector" group, CAD is positively 
related to both ROS and Growth. Perhaps because value added 
through assembly is more prevalent than design within this 
group, firms which do design are more differentiated. 
Within this group, CAD interacts negatively with Customer 
Stability in relation to both ROS and Growth. With a wide 
number of customers (customer instability), perhaps CAD is 
needed to design efficiently. The automation of design may 
allow even more customer prospecting and further growth. 
The six relationships just discussed appear reasonable 
for the most part. The explanations need to be viewed with 
caution as cause and effect are impossible to discover from 
this data even if it does exist. However, many of the 
relationships, especially the first two, make sense because 
of physical linkages similar to those discussed in the 
previous section on the nature of fit. 
One conspicuous pattern in these observations is that 
the technology-performance relationships do not take place 
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within the strategic groups that one might expect would most 
benefit from the technologies. While wide Range of Capabil¬ 
ities makes sense for firms in the "One-of-a-Kind" group, it 
is the "Opportunists" which have the higher levels of this 
technology, and for which "Range of Capabilities" would seem 
to fit with the strategy of the group. Dedicated Automation 
is more a part of "Hi-Volume Parts" than "Service Volume," 
yet it is the later where a performance impact is seen. CNC 
does relate to performance for "Hi-Volume Parts," but one 
would think such a relationship would also occur in the 
"Service Volume" group before it did in the "No-Frills 
Volume" group, given the higher product stability of the 
former. CAD should be more important to the "One-of-a-Kind" 
group which does the most designing than it is for the "Hi- 
Precision Prospector" group. 
It might be that such technologies are more of a given 
in the seemingly more relevant groups, and as such do not 
provide strategic advantage. First mover advantages of 
early adoption of new technologies has been noted by other 
scholars (e.g., Porter, 1983, 1985; Schroeder, 1990). These 
technologies (most of which are new, e.g., CAD, CNC, Multi- 
Axis CNC, Automatic Parts Changing) may have more of an 
advantage in groups where the technologies are "newer" so to 
speak, and provide a source of differentiation. On the 
other hand, "new" may have less to do with it than being in 
a viable but minority position within the group, itself a 
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source of differentiation. Schroeder (1990) found evidence 
of this in the foundry industry, where some firms formed a 
very profitable niche with the unique capabilities of the 
older process technologies discarded by the majority of 
firms. 
Questions remain as to why firms which do not use a 
technology which seems most appropriate for their strategy 
are not suffering negative performance. Again we can refer 
back to the uncertainties of performance assessment, or the 
complexity of factors that impact performance. Perhaps 
these firms compensate in subtler ways than can be picked up 
by strategic grouping, or the methods of this study in 
general. Issues of firms surviving or benefiting from the 
temporary advantage of new technologies are not fully serve 
by the cross-sectional nature of this study. 
6.5 Generalizabilitv of Findings 
Given the results of this study, the next important 
question is to assess to what degree these findings are 
generalizable to other settings. A large part of whether 
these findings can be projected to other industries involves 
the two major constructs of this study, process technology 
and competitive strategy. The generalizability of this 
study’s process technology construct derives primarily from 
the dimensions used to characterize technology. The 
136 
generalizability of the strategy construct depends not only 
on whether the strategy dimensions make sense in other 
industries, but also on whether the groupings or gestalts of 
these dimensions have any meaning in other industries. 
This section first examines the generalizability of the 
technology and strategy dimensions. The strategic groups 
derived from the dimensions are then examined against other 
strategic group research, and against generic strategy 
typologies. Finally, the overall generalizability of the 
industry will be touched on. 
6.5.1 Strategy and Process Technology Dimensions 
The main question concerning the strategy and technol¬ 
ogy factor analyses is whether the dimensions found are 
merely unique to the industry studied, or are to some degree 
fundamental, and thus generalizable to other industries. 
Part of the answer lies in the intent of the measures 
gathered. The measures were gathered to reflect general¬ 
ized, theoretical strategy dimensions as identified by other 
works, so it is not too surprising that the resulting 
factors correspond quite closely with the literature as 
demonstrated earlier. However, measures could conceivably 
have been related and grouped any number of ways other than 
as predicted. Thus comparability between the factors and 
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the theoretical dimensions support to some extent the 
generalizability of this study’s factors. 
A key aspect to the generalizability of the strategy 
and technology dimensions is that interpretation of measures 
should be made relative to the sample context. Among the 
strategy dimensions, "Product Characteristics" (from Table 
3.1) is an important strategy differentiator in any setting, 
but deciding which product characteristics are key depends 
on the sample industry. In this study, "precision" was a 
key characteristic. The degree of "Product Stability" 
probably differs most widely between industries in an 
absolute sense, but within one industry, one should find a 
range of differences which is strategically meaningful. 
Although the options firms have for "Service" will certainly 
depend on the industry, the importance of differentiation 
based on service is relevant to most conceivable industry 
settings. 
On the technology side, the process technology of any 
firm should have a "Range of Capabilities," but the defining 
dimensions, and what is considered wide and narrow range, 
will depend on the industry context. In this sample, range 
was primarily differentiated on the breadth of part sizes 
and complexity accommodated. 
This study’s automation dimensions form a scale that is 
relevant to most conceivable process technology situations 
if taken relative to a particular industry context. The 
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scale runs from Non-Dedicated, Non-Automated technologies 
(conventional machine tools in our sample), to Non-Dedicated 
Automation (CNC machine tools), to Dedicated Automation. 
This scale is very similar to Jelinek & Goldhar’s (1983) 
Independent Tools & Methods, Programmable System, Flexible 
Systems, and Dedicated Systems. While "Non-Dedicated 
Automation" is perhaps a more generalizable way to charac¬ 
terize the middle of the scale than their "Programmable 
Systems" and "Flexible Systems" (because of potential 
confusion between "Flexible Systems" and the hardware 
specific term "Flexible Manufacturing Systems"), neither 
scale would be generalizable if fixed in hardware terms. 
What is considered "Dedicated" or "Automated" hardware 
surely depends on the industry, but the technology choices 
of most any industry probably have some meaningful differen¬ 
tiation along the dimensions of automation and dedication. 
Given the relative nature of specific measures, 
scholars need to be careful in discussing the strategic 
implications of specific hardware technologies. For 
example, the flexibility of CNC technologies is often 
extolled without adequate specification of context. CNC is 
often equated with flexibility, but the results of HI show 
that it is a fairly inflexible technology choice within this 
sample industry. 
A few proposed dimensions did not materialize. One was 
the difference between physical and computer integration. 
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This is mostly due to the fact that there is very little 
computer integration in this industry. Studies in other 
industries such as the Automobile industry would likely pick 
up this dimension in more highly computerized plants such as 
General Motor’s new Saturn plant with its complex materials 
requirements planning systems. The systemization dimension 
proposed by Kotha & Orne (1989) would likely be an important 
underlying dimension in studies which went beyond the 
hardware focus of this study to the procedures technologies 
that surround hardware. 
In addition, as noted above in the discussion of HI, a 
distinction between new and existing product stability did 
not emerge from this sample. The impact on this study’s 
results is minimal because, as noted above, the two stabili¬ 
ties are very related in this contracting oriented sample. 
In addition, both new and existing product stability were 
expected to have roughly the same relationship to physical 
integration or dedicated automation. In other sample 
industries, new and existing product stability may be 
unrelated, resulting in different relationships with regard 
to non-dedicated automation. 
In sum, although additional dimensions may emerge in 
other studies, the factor analyses of strategy and technol¬ 
ogy measures result in underlying dimensions which corre¬ 
spond well with those suggested by the literature as 
important. These dimensions should be generalizable to most 
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industries if measures are applied relative to a specific 
context. 
6.5.2 Generalizability of the Strategic Groups 
Given the formation of strategic groups in this study, 
it is important to reflect on how these groups compare to 
other methods for assessing strategy. First, how do the 
strategic groups of this study correspond to the generic or 
universal typologies of Porter (1980) and Miles & Snow 
(1978)? Hambrick (1983a) asserts that the Miles & Snow 
typology cannot be used to compare strategies between 
industries, only within an industry. Likewise, Porter 
states that his strategy types are really generic strategic 
groupings, which only relate firms within an industry. What 
is generalizable about these typologies is that they are 
claimed to represent the fundamentally viable strategic 
positions or types within any industry. Do the types found 
in our study appear to be generalizable in the same way? 
A useful way to investigate this question is to assign 
this study’s groups to the strategy types of Porter and 
Miles & Snow. While they each found three viable types, 
this study found six meaningful strategic groups. From the 
perspective of Porter’s strategies, this studies types 
appear to correspond as follows in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 
Strategic Groups and the Porter Typology 
Porter’s Types Strategic Groups Numbe 
Low Cost: "Hi-Volume Parts" (2) 
"No Frills Volume" (5) 
Differentiation: "Hi-Precision Prospector" (3) 
"Service Volume" (4) 
Focus: "One-of-a-Kind" (1) 
"Opportunist" (6) 
Clearly, groups two and five with their volume and 
intense price competition can be considered low cost 
strategies. Groups three and four, with their value added 
and price premium, appear to be differentiators. Group one 
focuses on a stable customer base and one-of-a-kind work 
while group six focuses on opportunities within a very local 
scope. 
Although the distinctions between differentiation and 
focus may not be clear, the pattern that emerges from this 
comparison is clear. This study’s groups represent differ¬ 
ent approaches to low cost, different dimensions on which to 
differentiate, or different things on which to focus. 
Porter (1980) recognizes that different approaches to the 
generic strategies are possible, but chooses to emphasize 
the broader differences. Similar to this study, Schroeder 
and Congden (1990) found what they considered to be three 
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meaningfully different approaches to differentiation and two 
approaches to low cost. 
An assignment of the strategic groups to the Miles & 
Snow typology also yields different approaches to their 
strategy types (see Table 6.3). 
Table 6.3 
Strategic Groups and the Miles & Snow Typology 
Miles & 
Snow Types Strategic Groups Number 
Defender: "One-of-a-Kind" (1) 
"Hi-Volume Parts" (2) 
"No Frills Volume" (5) 
Prospector: "Hi-Precision Prospector " (3) 
"Opportunist" (6) 
Analyzer: "Service Volume" (4) 
With high customer and product stability, groups two 
and five are defender strategies. While group one has very 
high customer stability and is probably a defender, it could 
also be thought of as an analyzer for its unstable products. 
Group four has reasonably high product stability but 
unstable customer relationships, and thus falls in the 
middle as an analyzer. Groups three and six have very low 
customer stability and high product range, and are thus 
prospector strategies. In essence, there are different 
approaches to these types depending on whether one empha- 
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sizes new product stability, existing product stability, or 
customer stability as the key dynamic. 
Although the Miles & Snow typology assignments may not 
be perfect, a comparison with the Porter assignments shows 
that the two typologies result in different groupings. For 
example, groups three and six are of the same Miles & Snow 
type whereas they are each grouped with a different Porter 
strategy type. This results from different conceptual 
underpinnings. The Miles & Snow typology is base on 
differences in product-market stability whereas Porter 
concentrates on whether or not firms differentiate their 
product offerings enough to command price premiums. 
The larger point is that perhaps both of these concep¬ 
tual underpinnings are important for particular situations, 
such as linking strategy with process technology. In such 
situations, strategic groups should not be further clustered 
together and reduced to a few broad archetypes. 
Each of the six groups did result in meaningful process 
technology differences. This is especially evident if one 
compares the technology differences (Table 5.4) of the 
groups that are assigned to the same generic strategy type 
(Porter, 1980). For the two low cost strategies, Group 5 
has significantly less CAD and Range of Capabilities than 
Group 2, as it is strictly no frills, while Group 2 has high 
Dedicated Automation for its higher product stability. 
Because of its prospecting nature, Group 3 has a high "Range 
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of Capabilities” relative to Group 4, while the later has 
higher automation for its greater product stability. Group 
1 has significantly higher CAD than Group 6 because of its 
value added from design, while the later has a very high 
Range of Capabilities for its prospecting nature. These 
technology difference support the arguments in Chapter 3 
that further sub-division of the generic strategy types 
would permit us to see more detailed technology relation¬ 
ships. 
In addition to meaningful technology differences, the 
strategic differences of the six groups appear meaningful. 
First, based on case studies from prior research in the 
sample industry which seem to parallel the strategic groups 
in this study, the groupings are meaningful because their 
markets really do not overlap very much. Second, each 
strategic group consists of a different mix of strategic 
priorities that interact in a way that makes intuitive 
sense. 
With regard to the question of generalizabi1ity, from 
our analysis, the strategic groupings are potentially 
generalizable if subsumed under one of the generic typolo¬ 
gies. However, this would defeat the purpose of the more 
detailed strategic groupings we have just argued for. The 
exact six types here are probably not generalizable because 
different approaches to the generic strategies may hinge on 
other strategic dimensions in other samples. However, the 
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fact that different approaches to the generic strategies 
were found to be meaningful is important in itself. 
Some generalizability can still be inferred if our 
grouping process conforms to standards of strategic grouping 
literature. As noted previously, mobility barriers have 
been the primary rationale behind strategic grouping. 
Indeed Mascarenhas & Aaker (1989) assert that mobility 
barriers are the only meaningful basis for strategic 
grouping. This study grouped primarily on product-market 
variables because the strategy-technology literature 
generally takes a product-market view of strategy and 
because process technology, although undoubtedly a mobility 
barrier, needs to be treated separately from strategy if one 
is to determine whether there is such a thing as fit between 
the two. Other types of "resource commitments" (Cool & 
Schendel, 1987) or "industry supply characteristics" (McGee 
& Thomas, 1986) such as distribution and R&D would have been 
included in this studies grouping if relevant to the sample 
industry. 
The good news borne by the results of H3 is that 
because of the fit between process technology and strategy, 
the more product-market oriented groupings formed in this 
study effectively do take into account the mobility barriers 
posed by process technology. The significant differences in 
technology between the strategic groups of this study 
undoubtedly hinder movement between the groups. 
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In addition, the literature focus on tangible assets as 
mobility barriers overlooks the possibility that product- 
market strategies are not easily imitated. For example, 
successful service strategies depend on suitable behavioral 
patterns and mind-sets, and a service reputation, neither of 
which is easily established. This may be no less of a 
barrier than the capital needed to go out and purchase new 
process technologies. One concludes that the strategic 
groups of this study are congruent with the mobility 
barriers rational behind strategic grouping. 
The degree to which conforming to the standards of 
strategic grouping practice affords some generalizability, 
however, is uncertain because standards are still emerging 
(McGee & Thomas, 1986; Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989; Cool & 
Schendel, 1987). However, most strategic grouping seems to 
be defined around two broad concepts of product-market 
choice ("Business scope commitments," Cool & Schendel, 1987; 
"Market related strategies," McGee & Thomas, 1986) and 
different deployments of resources to serve those markets 
("Resource commitments," Cool & Schendel, 1987; "Industry 
supply characteristics," McGee & Thomas, 1986). Cool & 
Schendel (1987) propose that these two dimensions compose 
the core of strategic grouping. The groups of this study 
essentially conform to this core. Further strategic groups 
research is needed to establish these or more specific 
dimensions as the common core of strategic groups analysis. 
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6.5.3 Industry Generalizabilitv 
A large part of whether results in this industry are 
generalizable to other industries stems from the generaliz- 
ability of the technology dimensions and the strategic 
approach discussed above. Nevertheless, it appears that the 
results of this study will be least generalizable to service 
industries for three reasons. First, the tooling and 
machining industry is a manufacturing industry. Whether 
manufacturing technologies bear enough resemblance to 
service industry technologies so that basic relationships 
(e.g., with respect to automation) hold is uncertain. 
Second, many of the service priorities in this industry 
showed little relationship to technology. Third, the 
hardware focus of this study may be less appropriate. 
However, with expansion of the definition of process 
technology to include procedures, and with use of a "system- 
ization" dimension, the approach taken by this study should 
translate to service industries. 
This study’s results should relate to other manufac¬ 
turing industries, but the special contract nature of the 
sample industry raises some questions. The sample industry 
is very competitive so that one might expect a closer 
alignment (stronger relationship) if fit is important. In 
addition, because other functional areas such as R&D, 
Marketing, Distribution, play less of a role in this 
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predominately contract industry, one would expect a stronger 
fit where operations was the primary focus of firms. 
Nevertheless, both of these concerns deal with the strength 
of the relationship; there is no reason to suspect that fit 
does not exist in other manufacturing industry. 
6.6 Contribution to Current Research 
Like previous studies (Schroeder, 1990; Schroeder et 
al., 1988, 1989), this study found that manufacturing tech¬ 
nologies do differ meaningfully between different strategies 
within an industry. This work extends the previous observa¬ 
tions of the existence of fit by demonstrating statistical 
significance across a larger sample. 
In addition, while this study did not find sufficient 
evidence of fit related to performance, it is the first 
study attempting to statistically examine what has recently 
been described as the primary question facing research 
attempting to link manufacturing technology to competitive 
strategy (Anderson et al., 1990; Kotha & Orne, 1989). A 
viable research approach to this question, upon which future 
research can build, has been demonstrated 
A good deal was learned about the nature of fit. In 
the past, fit between process technology and strategy was 
primarily a question of choosing between efficient, 
automated technologies for a low cost, high volume strategy, 
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or more flexible, but less efficient technologies for a 
differentiation strategy (e.g., Abernathy & Townsend, 1975; 
Hayes & Wheelwright, 1979a,b). More recently, manufacturing 
strategy literature has argued that technology can impact 
business level strategy at a finer level of strategic 
priorities (e.g., Hayes & Schmenner, 1978; Skinner, 1984; 
Stobaugh & Telesio, 1983; Wheelwright, 1984). The advent of 
computer controlled technologies has prompted speculation 
that a trade-off between flexibility and efficiency is now 
greatly diminished (Adler, 1988; Blois, 1985; De Meyer et 
al. , 1989; Jelinek & Goldhar, 1983; Meredith, 1987; Thompson 
& Paris, 1982; Voss, 1986; Wheelwright, 1984). However, 
these recent works are conceptually based, providing little 
detail on specific linkages between manufacturing technology 
and strategy. An empirical study by Schroeder et al. (1989) 
reported specific linkages, but did not statistically 
validate them. 
This study found that new and existing product stabil¬ 
ity is positively related to automation technologies, both 
dedicated and non-dedicated. This finding is contrary to 
the idea that CNC is a flexible technology choice. As 
Schroeder et al. (1989) observed, the programming costs are 
too great for very small batches. This finding serves to 
remind us that specific hardware technologies have different 
strategic relevance in different industries. 
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This study also demonstrated that a particular technol¬ 
ogy often comes bundled with capabilities, each of which may 
be differentially important for various strategies. This 
makes one-to-one correspondence of particular technologies 
to particular strategies improbable, and the resulting 
performance impacts less strong. 
One key characteristic of fit is suggested by post hoc 
examination of correlations between strategy and technology 
factors. Manufacturing technology appears to relate to 
strategy primarily through strategic dimensions which are 
most directly related to physical characteristics of 
products, much of which derives from choice of market 
segment. Service and differentiation strategy dimensions 
appear less related to manufacturing technology. 
The approach taken by this study is also a meaningful 
contribution. The strategic groupings further demonstrate 
the usefulness of the strategic groups concept for determin¬ 
ing the important competitive positions within an industry. 
The effectiveness of cluster analysis in this grouping 
process was corroborated (see Harrigan, 1985). With respect 
to grouping variables, this study finds a difference between 
product stability (how many times a firm has to change 
production over for new or other already existing products), 
and product range (the breadth of how different products of 
a firm are from one another in size, complexity, fragility, 
processing requirements, etc.). Product range generally has 
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not been reported in the literature, but appears to be 
important in linking strategy to process technology. The 
difference between new and existing product stability has 
also not been made clear in literature discussion of 
flexibility. Although a difference was not found in this 
study, it may be important in other industries. 
On characterizing technology, this study demonstrates 
the viability of Kotha & Orne’s (1989) proposal that process 
technology be assessed along a number of underlying dimen¬ 
sions. They propose dimensions of mechanization (automa¬ 
tion), interconnectedness (integration), and systemization. 
This study contributes an additional dimension of "Range of 
Capabilities." A distinction between physical and computer 
integration is also recommended. These additional dimen¬ 
sions provide the means to differentiate technologies on 
more than just automation-integration, which has resulted in 
the powerful but not fully satisfying dictum of "flexibility 
versus efficiency." 
Overall, the approach taken by this study retains 
meaningful detail in the strategy and technology assessment 
so that the linkages with technology can emerge. 
6.7 Implications and Suggestions for Future Research 
While the approach taken by this study appears general- 
izable, more studies are needed to validate and expand its 
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results. The success this study had in finding process 
technology differences related to competitive strategy bodes 
well for such findings in other industries. The intra¬ 
industry approach ensures that technology differences 
meaningful within an industry are not obscured by more 
prominent relationships in more technology ladened indus¬ 
tries. The nature of fit as found from HI and H2 should 
hold in most settings as the hypotheses were derived from 
generalized reasoning. Research findings in other indus¬ 
tries may allow some cross-industry generalization in the 
form of strategy sub-typologies consisting of a limited 
number of meaningful approaches to the generic strategies. 
Finer linkages between strategy and technology may only hold 
within a limited number of industries of similar nature. 
A challenge to the results of this study might be found 
in less technologically oriented, service industries. 
Although Skinner (1984) asserts that manufacturing technol¬ 
ogy can impact on a number of service related strategic 
priorities, this study did not find evidence of service 
linkages. Many service priorities may be related to 
technologies more peripheral to process technology, such as 
"delivery technologies." As Porter (1983, 1985) notes, 
potential for technology based competitive advantage exists 
at every value stage. Still, it is not clear what the 
boundaries of "process" technology are. This study took a 
narrow focus looking only at hardware. A broader focus 
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including Kotha & Orne’s (1989) "systemization" might get at 
some of the less concrete "procedures" technologies. 
Service industries might be better served by such an 
approach. 
The "Range of Capabilities" dimension raises interest¬ 
ing questions about the idea of "factory focus" (Hill & 
Duke-Woolley, 1983; Skinner, 1974, 1984). In this study, 
having a wide range of capabilities seemed to be an integral 
part of two strategies ("Hi-Precision Prospector" and the 
"Opportunist" strategy). Should all strategies within an 
industry work toward factory focus, or can some firms form 
viable niches by focusing on "non-focus?" As Anderson et 
al. ( 1990 ) conclude, the idea of factory focus has much 
potential, but needs empirical research. 
This study’s finding on CNC machine tools’ relationship 
to product stability invites speculation on the impact of 
computer controlled technologies. While CNC machine tools 
are generally thought of as a "flexible" technology choice, 
programming costs make them the inflexible choice for very 
small batch sizes. As programming technologies develop, 
programmable technologies will yield increasing flexibility 
and efficiency for both new and existing product change- 
overs. On the margins, there should still be trade-off 
between efficiency and flexibility, especially considering 
that integration of computer controlled components will 
still tend toward product dedication and therefore less 
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flexibility. However, the trade off is bound to diminish in 
magnitude given the intense pursuit of both efficiency and 
flexibility by Japanese firms (De Meyer et al., 1989). 
Will this obscure strategy-technology relationships? 
Probably not. Jaikumar (1986) asserts that the focus of 
competitive advantage shifts to the initial design of 
flexible systems, and to continuous programming improve¬ 
ments. Manufacturing "procedures" technologies will become 
more important relative to "hardware." The range of 
capabilities will also become more important. Outside the 
design range, such systems are very inflexible given high 
installation time and cost. The importance of individual 
linkages between process technology dimensions and strategy 
dimensions may change, but it is difficult to imagine that 
the processes of all firms in an industry becoming so 
similar that they bear no relation to strategy. Much future 
research is needed to establish current technology-strategy 
linkages and to track their evolution. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
The concluding chapter consists of three sections. The 
first summarizes the findings of this study. This is 
followed by caveats and limitations with respect to the 
findings. Finally, the significance of the findings to 
scholars, practitioners, and future research is discussed. 
7.1 Summary of Findings 
Much has been written in the last decade about the 
importance of process technology to competitive strategy. 
Most of these works explicitly or implicitly contend that 
process or manufacturing technology needs to be congruent 
with or "fit" a firms’ business level strategy. Within an 
industry, a particular technology may or may not be appro¬ 
priate for every strategy. Using the wrong technology (poor 
"fit") is supposed to hurt firm performance. 
Except for some exploratory studies, these works are 
conceptually based, and contain little detail about specific 
linkages between technology and different dimensions of 
strategy. Only one empirical study (Schroeder et al., 1989) 
has addressed the issue of fit and performance, but it was 
exploratory in nature, with too few sample firms to assess 
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statistical significance. This study is the first to 
empirically address the issue of fit and performance with a 
large enough sample to test for statistical significance. 
Within the tooling and machining industry, this study 
confirmed the existence of fit between competitive strategy 
and process technology. The existence of fit was demon¬ 
strated by highly statistically significant differences in 
technology between strategic groups combined with the 
qualitative plausibility with which these differences appear 
to correspond to each strategy. This study did not find 
sufficient evidence to confirm the existence of fit related 
to firm performance. However, within five of the six 
strategic groups, this study found strong, positive rela¬ 
tionships between a particular process technology (technol¬ 
ogy factor or dimension) and either profitability (ROS) or 
firm growth in sales. While these relationships appear to 
make sense within the corresponding groups, the strategic 
group in which one would have expected a particular technol¬ 
ogy to be most important often did not exhibit a performance 
relationship with that technology. It may be that technol¬ 
ogy is more of a given for such groups, and thus provides no 
real advantage. In other groups where the technology is 
also appropriate but less widespread, a performance advan¬ 
tage may be gained by firms in which early adoption differ¬ 
entiates them from the other firms. 
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This study also discovered much about the "nature” of 
fit or specific linkages between technology and strategy. 
Dedicated and non-dedicated automation are most appropriate 
under conditions of new and existing product stability. In 
this setting, CNC was inflexible with regard to new 
products, reminding us that what constitutes relatively high 
stability and dedication depends on the industry context. 
In addition to new and existing product stability, which the 
literature often fails to differentiate between, this study 
finds that product range is an important characteristic of a 
firm’s products with respect to process technology. The 
range of capabilities of a firm’s process technologies, an 
important technology characteristic found by this study, 
often relates directly to product range. This study also 
found that firms with very different strategic needs will 
use the same technology because of different capabilities 
bundled in a given technology. This phenomena acts to 
obscure linkages between strategy and technology. Overall, 
technology appears to be most linked with strategic dimen¬ 
sions which are concerned with the physical characteristics 
of products, such as quality, the stability of new and 
existing products, differentness or range of products made, 
or extra processing of the products (value stages). These 
product attributes are primarily consequences of serving 
particular market segments. 
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7•2 Caveats and Limitations 
Caution needed in projecting these results comes from 
three sources: (1) the nature of the sample industry, (2) 
strategic grouping, (3) performance assessment. First, this 
study’s results need to be validated in other industry 
settings. The terms "manufacturing technology" and "process 
technology" were used interchangeably because the sample 
industry is a "manufacturing" industry. The process 
technologies of service industries may not be considered 
"manufacturing" technologies. Given the lack of linkages 
with service measures, the results of this study (the 
existence of fit) may not hold up in service industries 
unless a broader definition of technology is used (e.g., to 
include procedures). The results should translate to other 
manufacturing industries, although some differences in 
strategy can be expected due to the special contract nature 
of the sample industry. 
Second, although the detail of strategic grouping is 
needed to establish finer linkages, strategic group practice 
is not settled. This makes cross-industry comparisons of 
strategy difficult. Recent progress has been made with 
works by Cool & Schendel (1987, 1988), and Mascarenhas & 
Aaker (1989). Further strategic groups research is needed 
to make cross-industry generalizations more meaningful. 
Ultimately, finer grained sub-typologies which complement 
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generic strategy typologies might emerge. This and further 
research on technology’s relationship with strategy may 
result in a better understanding of which specific linkages 
are most relevant in which industry types. 
Third, performance assessment has to be viewed with 
caution. The meaning of return on sales is somewhat suspect 
because technology purchases are relatively significant 
investments for firms in this industry. Some firms may 
achieve above average short term profits by neglecting 
investment in new technologies for the future. Assessment 
of growth counteracts short term profits to some degree, but 
many factors impinge on growth. Large sample size and 
control for growth of customer industries should mitigate 
these problems. 
With respect to issues of performance measurement, 
because most firms are small and privately owned, self- 
reported, objective measures are probably more meaningful 
than accounting measure even if the later could have been 
obtained. The high response rate on performance measures 
(93 percent) attests to the explicit anonymity of the survey 
instrument, and suggests that respondents did not object to 
answering, and were therefore unlikely to knowingly report 
invalid performance scores. 
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7•3 Significance to Scholars, Practitioners and Future 
Research 
To bring closure to this study, reflection on its 
significance to scholars, practitioners, and future research 
is needed. For scholars, the importance of this disser¬ 
tation is its successful intra-industry approach. The 
actual findings, while new to the field, are of less direct 
importance than the fact that linkages between strategy and 
technology can be uncovered with this focused approach. 
Cross-industry studies must often dismiss detailed linkages 
as not appropriate for "allM industries before anything can 
be learned from them. Cross-industry or global research 
potentially results in problems of comparability among 
measures of strategy, as strategy is a relative phenomenon 
(Snow & Hambrick, 1980; Hambrick, 1983a). In the same way, 
the relationships of manufacturing technology to strategy 
may be relative. As development of business strategy theory 
is probably better served through an inductive approach of 
studying individual industries, (Datta, 1980; Ginsberg & 
Venkatramen, 1985; Spender, 1983), so to is understanding of 
the linkages with technology. 
This study has implications for strategic group 
research as well. Successful clustering of dimensions 
resulting in meaningful strategic groups adds to the success 
of previous strategic groups research at typing strategy 
within an industry. This study’s linking of process 
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technologies to strategic groups gives some assurance to 
researchers that groupings with a preponderance of product- 
market variables inherently reflects the "hard" mobility 
barrier of process technology. Like much previous strategic 
groups research (see Cool & Schendel, 1987; or McGee &. 
Thomas, 1986 for a review), this study did not find signifi¬ 
cant performance differences between strategic groups. 
Process technology may be an important moderator in the 
strategic groups-performance model. 
For managers, this study has implications for the 
survival and performance of firms. The realization that 
strategy and technology are closely related is important to 
deciding which firms are chosen as frames of reference. 
This study suggests that performance advantage from a 
technology may come only to the earlier adopters, but after 
a point, a technology is necessary despite the fact that it 
no longer brings a performance advantage. 
With respect to future research, the successful results 
of this study should encourage further research on the 
linkages between strategy and process technology. Specific 
issues suggested for inclusion in future research are (1) 
the difference between new and existing product stability, 
(2 ) assessment of relative product range and range of capa¬ 
bilities, (3) the difference between physical and computer 
integration, and (4) the degree of process systemization. 
Special topics for research include (1) the implications of 
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range of capabilites for the concept of factory focus, (2) 
the impact on the relative importance of technology-strategy 
linkages by evolution of process technologies, and (3) 
research in service industries. The intra-industry approach 
appears to be fruitful in discovering linkages while leaving 
plenty of territory for future research in other industries. 
Perhaps, in combination with other studies, a more general¬ 
ized but detailed understanding of fit will emerge. 
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APPENDIX A 
SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE 
TOOLING AND MACHINING 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
National Tboling & 
Machining Association 
PRECISION 
UNIVERSITY OF 
MASSACHUSETTS 
SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT 
This survey is being conducted in cooperation with the 
National Tooling & Machining Association and the 
University of Massachusetts School of Management 
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Issues addressed in this survey deal with your markets and products, strategies, equipment 
technologies, and performance. The questionnaire is being sent to NTMA members with 15 or more 
employees. Please answer questions relative to all tooling and machining firms of this size or 
larger, not just a few direct competitors. 
Questions either ask you to fill in an approximate percentage or to rank your company on a 7 
point scale. For questions with 7 point scales, circle a number closer to the description which 
better matches your situation. For example, 4 represents an average response appropriate when your 
situation falls in the middle of the two descriptions or when you do about equal amounts of either 
description. Circling a 1 or 7 means that your situation strongly matches one description and not 
the other. 
Every shop's experience is unique. Consequently, some questions may not match your experience 
perfectly. Your best approximations are better than no responses. 
MARKETS AND PRODUCTS 
1) Uhat percent ot production , sales! (ills in each ot the tollowir.g product types? (Totaling 100\) 
_ Jigs. Fixtures, A Gages 
 Dies (all types) 
_ Molds - Die Casting 
 Molds - For Plastics 
_ Molds - All Other 
 Special (Dedicated) Machines 
_ Precision Machined Parts 
 Metal Stampings 
_ Screw Machine Products 
 Machining Services (other than finished parts) 
_ All Other Products & Services (please specify: _ ) 
2) Cosptred to sost other tooling and aachinmg tirms. how would you describe your products? 
Simple 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Complex 
Small in size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Large in size 
Low precision 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High precision 
Each job new A different 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Repeat , routine 
Small lots/order quantities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Large lots/order quantities 
Narrow in range, similar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Broad in range, very different 
Capital intensive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Labor intensive 
In growing markets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 In declining markets 
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3) Ubat percent of production {sties) fells in each of tbe following tolerence renges? 
greater then .005" 
.005 - .003" 
.002 - .001" 
.0009 - .0006" 
.0005 - .0001" 
let* than .0001" 
Total 
« 100% 
4) Vbet percent of production (sties) fells in eecb of tbe following order/lot/betcb size categories? 
one-of-a-kind 
2-9 
10 - 49 
50 - 149 
150 - 499 
500 - 2500 
over 2500 
parts/piece* 
Total 
• 100% 
5) Approxiattely _ percent of our sties ere repeat orders (stae exict part). 
6) Approxiattely _ percent of our sales are to custoaers requiring just-in-tiae (JIT) deliveries. 
Approxiattely _ percent of our sales are to custoaers requiring Statistical Process Control (SPC) 
checks on tbeir deliveries. 
7) Uhicb best describes your customers? 
Declining industry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Growing industry 
"Low tech" 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 "High tech" 
New, first tiae 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Repeat, saae custoaers 
Non- Government 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Governaent related 
Fev i in nuaber 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Many in nuaber 
8) Percent of sales to custoaers located: (Totaling 100%) 
_ Locally (within 100 tiles or so) 
 Regionally (for exaaple, Southeast, Mid-Atlantic, etc.) 
_ Nationally 
 Internationally 
9) Percent of sales to custoaers in tbe following industries: (Totaling 100%) 
Autoaotive 
Aerospace 
Ordnance 
Appliances 
Electrical Machinery 
Electronics 
Agricultural Equipaent 
Mining, Construction, t Oil Field Equipaent 
Cheaical t Petroleua 
Food Processing fc Packaging 
Pharaaceuticals 
Machinery, Parts, & Accessories 
Fabricated Metal Products (not listed above) 
Other (please specify): _ 
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10) Vhat percent ol your sales ere done on a contact basis? 
Vhat percent ot your sales are proprietary (your own products)? 
STRATEGIES 
11) Hoe would you characterize the 
Prmry eaphasis on 
keeping costs lowest 
relative to cocpetitors 
way in which you compete? 
12)456 
Emphasis on service, quality, 
value added, special capaci¬ 
ties, etc., to differentiate 
our firs froa coapetitors. 
12) How is the design of your products accomplished? 
Ve do all 
design in bouse 12)456) 
Custoaer furnishes design 
with NO input froa us 
1)) Vhat basis is used for determining costs? 
Fixed shop rates 
for all work 12)4567 
Cost systea with different 
rates for different work 
centers and/or workers. 
14) How do you price contract work? 
We strive to be 
the lowest bidder 12)4567 Cost plus (tiae 4 material) 
15) Our marketing effort focuses primarily on: 
Working closely with 
existing custosers 1 2 
Actively seeking 
4567 new custosers 
16) what percentage ot your sales are made through the following individuals? (Total = 100k) 
_ Top aanageaent 
 Coapany sales personnel 
_ Independent agent or representatives 
 Other (please specify): _ 
Ve keep our production costs low by: 
Investing in the latest Investing in inexpensive 
production equipaent 1 2 
for high efficiency 
) 4 5 6 7 production equipaent to 
keep capital costs down. 
Host of our equipment is used: 
Extensively and regularly 1 2 ) 4 5 6 7 Only occasionally, for special 
jobs. 
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19) Compiled to most tooling 4 machining liras, pletse rite the imporCince ol the following 
which you compete tor work: 
Unimportant 
Competitive pricing 1 2 
Close tolerances 1 2 
Dimensional uniformity or consistency 1 2 
Verifiable quality assurance ("Ship to Stock") 1 2 
Short lead times, quick turnaround from order to delivery 1 2 
Dependability at meeting promised delivery dates 1 2 
Being able to accommodate fluctuations in orders 1 2 
Ability to make a vide variety of different products 1 2 
Value added from engineering 4 design assistance 1 2 
Value added from extra processing such as assembly 1 2 
Frequent contact and close customer working relations 1 2 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
to the manner in 
Of primary 
6 1 
6 1 
6 7 
6 7 
6 7 
6 7 
6 7 
6 7 
6 7 
6 7 
6 7 
TECHNOLOGY 
20) Uhit percent ol your production (ales) is aide with7 (Totaling 100%) 
_ Conventional machine tools 
 NC controlled machine tools 
_ CNC controlled machine tools 
21) Uhit percent ol your totil machine tools ire? (Totaling 100%) 
_ Arranged by type of machining operation (turning, milling, grinding, etc.) 
 Arranged in work cells and/or grouped for specific products 
_ Arranged in an assembly line fashion 
 No particular layout scheme 
22) The range ol piece/part sizes our total equipment can do is: 
Narrow 1234567 Vide 
23) In general, bow would you describe your conventional machine tools? 
Standard, off the shelf 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Custom, special made 
Inexpensive compared 
to similar equipment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Expensive compared 
to similar equipment 
Having only necessary 
capabilities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Having extra capabilities for many 
possible situations 
Purchased used 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Purchased new 
Fully depreciated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Newly purchased 
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If your firm does not have NC or CMC machine tools, skip forward to question 11. 
24) How expensively is your CMC equipment used? 
Seldom in use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Always running 
general, bow would you describe your CMC or MC machine tools? 
through full shift 
Standard, off the shelf 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Custom, special made 
Inexpensive compared 
to similar equipment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Expensive compared 
to similar equipment 
Having only necessary 
capabilities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Having extra capabilities for many 
possible situations 
Purchased used 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Purchased new 
Fully depreciated 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Newly purchased 
Mostly 2 axis 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Multi-axis 
26) Viat percent ot your CMC machine tools are? (Totaling 100k) 
_ 2 axis 
 2.5 axis 
_ 3 axis 
 4 axis 
_ 5 or aore axis 
27) To what degree does your firm have and use the following? 
Kulti-spindle CNCs 
CNCs with autoaatic tool changers 
Automatic monitoring of tool breakage 
Automatic gaging 
CNCs programmable for tool wear 
CNCs set up to run unattended 
Secondary operation capabilities 
on CNC equipment (for example, a 
milling spindle on a lathe) 
Automatic parts changing 
(such as multi-purpose robots 
or automatic pallet changers) 
Dedicated material handling equipment 
(such as conveyors, transfer lines) 
Do not 
have 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Have but 
do not use 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Used 
moderately, 
for some of 
our production 
12 3 4 
3 4 
1 2 3 4 5 
Used 
extensively, 
for most of 
our production 
6 7 
6 7 
6 7 
6 7 
6 7 
6 7 
6 7 
6 7 
6 7 
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Which ot the following capabilities do you use? (Check appropriate response (i)) . 2i, 
l4i H° 
Stand-alone computer aided design system (CAD) 
Stand-alone CNC code programming computer (CAM) 
Integrated CAD/CAM system 
Electronically download to machine tools from 
programming computer (i.e. DNC network) 
Take machine code programs from customer's 
CAD/CAH without exchange of blueprints 
29) l/bat percentage ot your CNC programming is done by the following people? (Totaling 100%) 
_ Machine operators 
 Assigned or dedicated programmer, technician 
_ Foreman or supervisor 
 Engineer 
_ Contract programer 
 Customers 
10i Our CNC machine tool operators have: 
minimal training 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extensive training, journeyman level 
broad skill range 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 narrow range of skills 
little experience 1234567 extensive experience 
Our conventional machine tool opera tors have: 
minimal training 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extensive training, journeyman level 
broad skill range 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 narrow range of skills 
little experience 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extensive experience 
32) What percentage ot your newly hired shop-floor employees are best described by each of the following 
categories? (Totaling 100%) 
_ Unskilled 
_ Fresh from tech schools 
_ Partially skilled, some experience from other firms 
_ Highly experienced, journeyman level from other firms 
PERFORMANCE 
33) First three numbers ot your firm's postal zip code: X X (used for regionalizing results) 
(Over for last page) 
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34) Current Dumber ol shop-floor employee*: 
Curreat Dumber ot total employees: _ 
Please rink your firs'* perfornance over the p**t three veers relative to cost other tooling ind Bichlinng 
firs* (•* best you cm judge). The questionnaire* ere enonynous. Circle the ippropriite nueher: 
lowest lower middle next top 
20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 
35) After-tax return on mvestmeot 1 2 3 4 5 
36) After-tax return on sales 1 2 3 4 5 
37) Total sales growth over past J years 1 2 3 4 5 
38) Firm's overall performance 1 2 3 4 5 
39) Over the pest 1 year*, eh at hi* been your average 
_ los* of eore thin 15% 
_ lo*« of 11 to 15% 
_ loss of 6 to 10% 
_ loss of 0 to 5% 
after tax return on sales? (check ippropriite citegory) 
_ profit of 0 to 5% 
_ profit of 6 to 10% 
_ profit of 11 to 15% 
_ profit of 16 to 20% 
_ profit of eore thin 20% 
40) Approximate Sales Volume: _ _ _ _ 
1986 1987 1988 1989 
Think you for your tine ind effort in conpleting this questionniire. Teel free to write down idditioml 
consents. Pleise return the questionniire in the enclosed self-addressed, postage-paid envelope to: 
Dr. Dean M. Schroeder 
School of Minigenent, 340 SON 
University of Massachusetts 
Aaherst, KA 01003 
Additional Consents Welcose: 
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APPENDIX B 
COVER LETTER 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS Department of Management 
AT AMHERST 
School of Management 
Amherst. MA 01003 
(413) 549-4930 
December 21, 1989 
Joseph R Petras 
Machine Tooling, Inc. 
7507 Exchange Avenue 
Cleveland, OH 44125 
Dear Mr. Petras: 
We need your help in completing and returning the enclosed 
questionnaire. This should take approximately 15 minutes. 
Confidentiality is assured because we cannot trace the surveys to 
respondents. 
Determining the appropriate machine tools and equipment a shop 
requires has been complicated by the introduction of many 
expensive new computer controlled machining technologies. Our 
work indicates that there are company and market situations in 
which these new technologies are absolutely necessary and other 
situations in which they are an unjustified financial burden. In 
cooperation with the National Tooling & Machining Association, we 
are conducting a study to more precisely identify these 
situations. 
The results of our research will be published in the NTMA 
newspaper (The Record) and made available to both the Association 
and its members. Our hope is that such information will help 
tooling and machining shop managers with their equipment 
decisions. If you have any questions on the study, please write 
or call (413) 549- 4930. Thank you for your time. 
Sincerely, 
Steven W. Congden, MBA, ABD 
Research Associate Professor of Business Strategy 
Tne University of Massacnusetts is an Affirmative Action/Egual Opportunity Institution 
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